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COMMENTARY: TEXTUALISM AND TAX CASES*
Deborah A. Geier **
"We do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means."
-Oliver Wendell Holmes1
Though not yet tenured, I bravely submit this Commentary for publication and would be
proud to list it on my resume. See Arthur Austin, Commentary on Jensen's Commentary on
Commentary, 24 CONN. L. REV. 175, 182 (1991) ("[A]nyone going up for tenure with a commentary
credit on his resume is in a high-risk category."); Erik M. Jensen, Law Review Correspondence:
Better Read Than Dead?, 24 CONN. L. REV. 159, 166 n.42 (1991) ("I have heard of deans and
faculties who prefer that colleagues write nothing rather than produce short, literate essays.
Needless to say, when faculty incentives are skewed in favor of little or no publication, faculty will
devote their best nonefforts to that result."). While I do not consider myself "supremely self-
confident," see W. Lawrence Church, Commenting on Commentaries, 24 CONN. L. REv. 185, 190
(1991) ("[c]ertainly, none but the most supremely self-confident untenured aspirant would now dare
to buck the tide against the current [of long, traditional articles] at most law schools"), I do believe
in the value of the short essay (notwithstanding this interminable footnote and lengthier-than-
originally intended Commentary) and believe that I am lucky enough to have faculty colleagues who
agree with me.
Released from any pretentions of grand authority, short essays and articles can generate
discourse; they can act as a goad toward further debate. In making their points briefly and
directly, they can aspire to engage the interest and response of their readers .... If they are
kept short and readable enough, such offerings might actually be read. Then they could
precipitate the sort of dialogue the law reviews exist to promote.
Id. at 193.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univer-
sity. J.D., 1986, Case Western Reserve School of Law; A.B., 1983, Baldwin-Wallace College. My
thanks go to David R. Barnhizer and James Wilson for their helpful comments on an earlier draft
and to Linda Ammons for her helpful discussions on the subject matter.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899). Judge Easterbrook, a textualist soul mate of Justice Scalia, see, e.g., Frank Easterbrook,
Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983), has quoted this Holmes aphorism approvingly.
In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989). Professor Zeppos notes the irony of this in view
of the fact that the pragmatic Holmes later wrote that "every question of construction is unique, and
an argument that would prevail in one case may be inadequate in another." Nicholas S. Zeppos,
Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1374 (1990) (quoting United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S.
394, 402 (1916)). Justice Holmes's pragmatism in statutory interpretation, recognizing that an ap-
proach to any particular statutory case must be shaped by the nature of the statute, the area of law,
and the precise issue rather than be guided by any single grand theory of statutory interpretation,
accords with my own pragmatism. See infra note 3, notes 59-64 and accompanying text, and notes
167-68 and accompanying text.
Cf Arthur D. Austin, Footnotes as Product Differentiation, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1131, 1144
(1987) ("The most pretentious form of first page differentiation is the 'lead-in' quotation whereby the
author prefaces the main body of the text with a quote from an esteemed scholar, a famous decision,
or some other prestigious source.").
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I. PROLEGOMENON
More than 100 years ago, a German jurist wrote of a special heaven re-
served for theoreticians of the law where one would find, among other things, a
"dialectic-hydraulic-interpretation press, which could press an indefinite number
of meanings out of any ... statute .... ,,2 Some modem-day earthlings, called
"deconstructionists," seem to believe that we have arrived at this hermeneutic
state of affairs without the need of leaving terra firma.3 Tax lawyers, however,
2. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 809 (1935) (citing VON JHERING, IM JURISTISCHEN BEGRIFFSHIMMEL, IN SCHERZ UND ERNST
IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 245 (11th ed. 1912)).
3. See Erik M. Jensen, A Day in the Life ofS. Breckenridge Tushingham, 69 DENy. U. L. REV.
231, 241 (1992) ("And who's this guy, Herman Newdics, that everyone talks about?").
The academic orthodoxy associated with "hard-core" deconstruction, see infra notes 162-68
and accompanying text (distinguishing between hard-core and soft-core deconstruction), cannot be
condensed into a short description. In his quite accessible book on deconstruction, David Lehman
uses over a hundred pages to set the stage for an ensuing ten-page, ten-point summary of what he
believes to be the tenets of orthodox deconstruction. See DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE TIMES:
DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN 104-13 (1991). One fundamental tenet of the
deconstructionist is the indeterminacy of text. "Words can have no single fixed meaning. Like
wayward electrons, they can spin away from their initial orbit and enter a wider magnetic field. No
one owns them or has a proprietary right to dictate how they will be used." Id. at 19. Thus, all text,
broadly defined to include history and philosophy, is indeterminate, reduced to irreconcilable binary
opposites.
The abstruse movement in legal academia known as "Critical Legal Studies" is the legal branch
of literary deconstruction. "The underpinning of Critical Legal Studies is a theory of indeterminacy
derived from deconstruction-as if the interpretation of statutes and precedents were somehow an
extension of literary criticism rather than a fundamentally different activity, involving different
objectives, undertaken in a different spirit." Id. at 38. See generally Peter C. Schanck, The Only
Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative Histo-
ries, 38 KAN. L. REV. 815, 820-33 (1990) (briefly describing and critiquing deconstruction and its
role in Critical Legal Studies).
Cass R. Sunstein and others have argued that even if text is essentially indeterminate, so that
interpreting the text is tantamount to creating its meaning, the exercise of judging is not an exercise
of raw power. "To make the unsurprising point that the choice among interpretive strategies or
background norms implicates a value judgment is hardly to say that the choice is arbitrary. The
existence of judgments of value leads to a conclusion of arbitrariness only for the most incorrigible of
positivists." Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 407,
442 (1989). Few pragmatists could disagree with that insight. Perhaps the task, then, should be to
identify consciously and to agree upon (the latter being the more difficult task) the background
interpretive norms that should govern statutory interpretation in those hard cases where reliance on
such norms is most explicit. See id. at 460-503 (proposing interpretive norms).
On the other hand, perhaps all such efforts to mechanize statutory interpretation are simply
wrongheaded. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. The eminently sensible approach set
forth by William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey is irresistibly tantalizing in its "pooh-on-
grand-theory" overtones. They argue that just as practitioners consult eclectic sources in interpret-
ing statutes when advising clients-including "the relevant statutory provisions, any legislative his-
tory that is available, the context in which the legislation was enacted, the overall legal landscape,
and the lessons of common sense and good policy"- so should judges. William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321 (1990)
(rejecting as inadequate, when viewed alone, what they consider to be three foundational theories of
statutory interpretation: intentionalism, purposivism, and textualism). "Judges' approaches to stat-
utory interpretation are generally eclectic, not inspired by any grand theory, and this is a good
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are musty old curmudgeons 4 who, for quite practical reasons, need to insist
upon a defined and limited range of meanings regarding the words used in the
Internal Revenue Code.5
The age-old debate over how to determine statutory meaning has gained a
remarkable renascence since Antonin Scalia reached the Supreme Court,6 occur-
ring just as some legal scholars began seriously to advance those "nihilist theo-
ries about the indeterminacy of language." 7 Justice Scalia's method of statutory
methodology." Id. at 321-22. Along this line lies Justice Stevens's eloquent elaboration of his "fifth
canon of statutory interpretation" that "requires judges to use a little common sense." John Paul
Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (1992);
see also Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 449
(1989) ("Pragmatist interpretation asks, therefore, what are the consequences of the alternative read-
ings of the statutory provision in question? Which one is, all things considered-notably including
all things that lawyers are sensitized by their craft to consider pertinent-the best?"). Cf Gwen T.
Handelman, Zen and the Art of Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment,
40 DEPAUL L. REV. 611 (1991) (discussing the tax lawyer's private lawmaking in advising clients
regarding positions to take on tax returns).
4. But see Erik M. Jensen, The Heroic Nature of Tax Lawyers, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 367 (1991)
(recounting the brave and daring exploits of the tax lawyer in John Grisham's bestseller, THE FIRM
(1991)).
5. Though they insist that statutes have meaning, and only a limited range of meanings at that,
I do not personally know any tax lawyers who are fascists.
A sympathetic and highly intelligent doctoral candidate told me in all earnestness that
"meaning is fascist." . . . We inhabit, he said, an indeterminate universe. Everything is
mediated entirely through language-the only way we can know anything is by using
words. And the words of any discourse constantly shift their meaning. Everything de-
pends on interpretation, and no interpretation is more correct than any other. The proper
attitude is to regard all interpretations as equally "not true and not false." To insist that a
given piece of discourse means something specific and decided is to elevate one meaning at
the expense of the others. It is to uphold a hierarchy of values, and that renders one guilty
of a dictatorial urge. Fascism, in short.
LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 58. Cf Jensen, supra note 4 (discussing the [nonfascist] heroic nature of
tax lawyers).
I confess to confusion in pondering that afailure to subscribe to deconstruction leads to fascism
when the apotheosis of deconstruction-the Newspeak in George Orwell's 1984-was Big Brother's
most potent apparatus.
George Orwell's 1984 is the canonical text on the dangers of the denial of objective
reality [which accompanies deconstruction]. The state's triumph over the recalcitrant indi-
vidual is sealed when a broken Winston Smith is persuaded that his torturer's four raised
fingers number five. What makes such mental manipulation possible is the state's control
of language. We can hardly be expected to applaud the disjunction between words and
what they refer to, if that is the condition that empowers a totalitarian state-such as the
one Orwell describes-to falsify the past and alter the terms of our existence by eliminating
some words and redefining others. Discourse, lacking a center, becomes an instrument of
power, and so, in the land of Big Brother, war is peace, freedom is slavery, and ignorance is
strength.
LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 99.
6. See generally Symposium, The Jurisprudence of Antonin Scalia, 12 CARDOzO L. REV. 1583
(1991) (containing 16 pieces commenting on various aspects of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence).
7. P. John Kozyris, In the Cauldron of Jurisprudence: The View From Within the Stew, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 421, 428 (1991).
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interpretation-which has been referred to as "the new textualism" 8 but which I
believe is more accurately expressed as "literalism"-is best described as the
virtual antithesis of deconstruction. According to Justice Scalia, texts are abso-
lutely determinate. 9 Moreover, the single legitimate means of arriving at that
determinate meaning is through a sterile parsing of the statutory text's words. 10
The "ordinary meaning"'1I and "natural reading"' 12 of words as they are "com-
monly understood"1 3 both begin and end the exegesis of the texts we call stat-
utes. (His application of these tenets also insists upon correct "Proper English"
with respect to both grammar and style,' 4 a dialect that unfortunately is neither
"ordinary," "natural," nor "commonly" used these days). 15
Textualism officially scorns the use of interpretive tools other than Black's
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Eskridge, New Textualism] (describing and critiquing in detail the development of Justice Scalia's
brand of textualism); see also Rob Bennett, The Supreme Court and 'Textualism" 49 TAx NOTES
109 (1990); Michael Herz, Textualism and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1663 (1991); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Inter-
pretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827 (1991); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice
Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. Rv. 1597 (1991) (each simi-
larly referring to Justice Scalia's method of statutory interpretation as "textualism").
9. But see William T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms. The Futility and Aconstitutionality
of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMORY L.J. 113, 157 (1992) (concluding that
textualism assumes indeterminacy).
10. The rise of textualism in the Supreme Court was already in motion before Justice Scalia
joined the Court. See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpreta-
tion in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982) (detecting trend toward relying on literal
words of statute). Justice Scalia, however, has surely solidified textualism as no one before.
11. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632 (1992) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("The proper rule of construction for express
pre-emption provisions is, it seems to me, the one that is customary for statutory provisions in
general: Their language should be given its ordinary meaning."); American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G.,
112 S. Ct. 2465, 2481 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Even if it were the case that my reading of the
clause rendered [a later amendment] superfluous, I would consider that a small price to pay for
adhering to the competing (and more important) canon that statutory language should be construed
in accordance with its ordinary meaning."); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031,
2037 (1992) ("mT1he key phrase, obviously, is 'relating to.' The ordinary meaning of these words is a
broad one-to stand in some relation; to have bearing or concern; to pertain; refer; to bring into
association with or connection with . . .- and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive pur-
pose."); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812, 816 (1992) ("The ordinary meaning of the phrase
'persecution on account of... political opinion' in § 101(a)(42) is persecution on account of the
victim's political opinion, not the persecutor's.").
12. See, e.g., American Nat'l Red Cross, 112 S. Ct. at 2478 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I therefore
conclude-indeed, I do not think it seriously contestable--that the natural reading of the 'sue and be
sued' clause . . .confers upon the Red Cross only the capacity to 'sue and be sued' in state and
federal courts ...."). Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2038 n.2 ("Suffice it to say that legislative history need
not confirm the details of changes in the law effected by statutory language before we will interpret
that language according to its natural meaning.").
13. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Wrigley Co., 112 S. Ct. 2447, 2453 (1992) (" '[s]olicitation,'
commonly understood, means '[a]sking' for, or 'enticing' to, something").
14. William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1142-48 (1992) [hereinafter Popkin, Internal Critique].
15. See Erik M. Jensen, To Whom It May Concern, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 2, 1991, at
5C; Erik M. Jensen, Is It a Crime to Murder the Queen's English?, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 10,
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law dictionary (and occasionally Webster's),' 6 the surrounding statutory lan-
guage, 17 and the entire United States Code'8 in deciphering the meaning of
words at issue and the resulting effects of a statute. Because Justice Scalia nar-
rowly looks to the dictionary and other statutes, he often disagrees with the
assertion that there exists an ambiguity in the first place in need of judicial reso-
lution; he finds clarity where others find an ambiguity in need of solution.' 9
Indeed, although one commentator has stated that "no one in his right mind
would advocate ... completely mechanizing the interpretation and application
of the law to remove the human factor in judging," 20 Justice Scalia seems to
come as close to that state of affairs as possible with respect to statutory inter-
pretation.2' Development of statutory meaning through case-by-case adjudica-
tion-cognizant of what Professor Sunstein calls the "background norms" that
inevitably affect statutory interpretation, 22 through what Professor Popkin calls
the "common-law" or "collaborative" approach to statutory interpretation 23
and by what Professor Eskridge calls the "dynamic approach" 24-is improper,
1987, at 5B; any of William Safire's On Language columns in the weekly NEW YORK TIMES SUN-
DAY MAGAZINE.
16. In the 1991-1992 term, Justice Scalia cited Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) in Wis-
consin Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. at 2453; Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160,
2166 (1992); United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867, 1872 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 784 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He used Black's
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) in Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2037. He cited Webster's Third New Inter-
national Dictionary (1981) in Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 112 S. Ct. at 2453 and cited Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1950) in Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875.
17. See, e.g., Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 779 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1874
(Scalia, J., concurring).
18. See Popkin, Internal Critique, supra note 14, at 1148-52 (describing Justice Scalia's use of
entire United States Code as grand "Super-Text" to be construed consistently with statute at issue).
19. [The majority] merely describes (uncritically) "the contrasting positions of the respec-
tive parties and their amici" concerning the meaning of § 506(d) ... and concludes, be-
cause the positions are contrasting, that there is "ambiguity in the text,".... (This mode
of analysis makes every litigated statute ambiguous.) Having thus established "ambigu-
ity," the Court is able to summon down its deus ex machina: "the pre-Code rule that liens
pass through bankruptcy unaffected"-which cannot be eliminated by an ambiguous provi-
sion, at least where the "legislative history" does not mention its demise.
Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia conceded that the Court has con-
sulted pre-Code treatment in resolving "genuinely ambiguous provisions" but disagreed that the text
was "genuinely ambiguous." Id. at 786. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (citing cases
in which Justice Scalia found no ambiguity under the first step in a Chevron analysis and thus re-
fused to defer to an agency construction of the statute).
20. Kozyris, supra note 7, at 429.
21. Some believe this description overstates the case. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 430 n.92
("Justice Scalia has, notably, endorsed some canons of construction.").
22. Id. at 412.
23. See Popkin, Internal Critique, supra note 14, at 1133-38 (contrasting Justice Scalia's textu-
alism with Justice Stevens's common-law approach); see also GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW
FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Note, supra note 10, at 912-15 (both touting common-law
model of statutory interpretation).
24. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987) [hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation].
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in Justice Scalia's view, as contrary to the "rule of law."'25
External context is ignored except in the case in which the "ordinary mean-
ing" of a word produces an absurd or "unthinkable" result. 26 In such a case,
Justice Scalia will consider context but only to confirm that there is no positive
evidence that Congress intended the absurd result reached using the "ordinary
meaning."'27 Justice Scalia's refusal to consider external context in other cases
results in an interpretive process that differs fundamentally from that of the hun-
dreds of other judges who have invoked the so-called "plain-meaning rule" over
the decades.
The interpretive process [for most judges] is almost certainly, as Judge
Posner suggests, one of moving back and forth between words and
other indicia of meaning without preconceived notions about whether
the words are clear. When courts rely on plain meaning, they are stat-
ing a conclusion reached after the interpretive process is complete, not
specifying a stopping point in the judicial process. 28
For Justice Scalia, reliance on plain meaning does, indeed, represent a "stopping
point in the judicial process" ninety-nine percent of the time. He would disagree
with the statement that "[e]xternal context always threatens to unsettle the plain
meaning of the statutory language,"' 29 for he would not consider the external
context in the first place.
While Justice Scalia invokes the Hart and Sacks notion that the judge's role
is to divine the animating purpose behind a statute and interpret the statute to
further it,30 he does not invoke it (as others do) in order to consult extra-statu-
tory sources of information. Rather, he believes that "the ordinary meaning of
[the statutory] language accurately expresses the legislative purpose. "31 Justice
Scalia particularly eschews references to the "original intent" 32 of the enacting
25. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
26. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 543, 594-95 (1988) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Popkin, Collaborative Model].
29. Id. at 598.
30. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 166 (tentative ed. 1958) (discussing policy as founda-
tion of statutory construction); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REV. 819, 823 (1991) (describing very
briefly the Hart and Sacks Legal Process approach and subsequent theories of political economy,
including the current rage, public-choice theory); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Val-
ues, 66 CHI-KENT L. REV. 365, 367 (discussing the authoritative, purpose, and truth values of
legislative history within the context of various critique frameworks); Popkin, Collaborative Model,
supra note 28, at 552-71 (describing "legislative will" as result of "private interest," "private com-
promise," or "public deliberation," with latter returning to notions of "broader community inter-
ests" and purpose inherent in Legal Process approach); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 446-51 (describing
public-choice theory and "deals").
31. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2633 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2031, 2036 (1992) (emphasis added)).
32. Though Professor Eskridge criticizes some of the excesses of Justice Scalia's textualism, he
applauds what he sees as textualism's rejection of intentionalism or originalism. "Significantly, the
[Vol. 66
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new textualism also frees formalism from the mortmain of archaeology and invites dynamic statu-
tory interpretation, a move that Justice Scalia's approach shares with most of the anti-formalist
theories of the 1980s." Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 8, at 667. Thus, Professor Eskridge
believes that Justice Scalia advocates dynamic interpretation of broadly intransitive statutes, such as
the Sherman Antitrust Act, and even of transitive statutes that have been amended since original
enactment. See id. at 667- 68; infra note 51 (discussing intransitive and transitive statutes), see also
Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24 (describing Professor Eskridge's theory of
dynamic statutory interpretation in more detail). But see Steven D. Smith, Correspondence: Law
Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105 (1989) ("present-oriented interpretation is deeply
flawed").
Justice Scalia's perceived rejection of originalism is consistent with his related view that agen-
cies ought to be able to interpret ambiguous statutory words according to contemporary understand-
ing. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 518 ("capacity of the Chevron approach to accept changes in agency interpretation un-
grudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indications that the Chevron approach is correct" [em-
phasis in original]). It is, however, inconsistent with statements he made in a speech given around
the country that statutes ought to be construed as of the time of enactment. See Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 454-55 (1988) (quoting
from speech given by Justice Scalia).
The supposed rejection of originalism could also be seen as inconsistent with his majority opin-
ion from the 1991-1992 term in County of Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992).
The issue in the case was whether fee-patented land owned by Indians on Indian reservations could
be subjected to property tax (and thus foreclosed upon for nonpayment) by the state of Washington.
Id. at 685. In the absence of express congressional authorization, states' taxing jurisdiction with
respect to Indians on Indian reservations is essentially nonexistent. "When on-reservation conduct
involving only Indians is at issue, state law is generally inapplicable, for the State's regulatory inter-
est is likely to be minimal and the federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its
strongest." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980). See also Montana
v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (striking down state severance tax on Indian royalties); Moe
v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (striking down state cigarette tax on
sales to Indians); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973) (upholding state tax on
Indian activity outside reservation); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164
(1973) (striking down state income tax on Indian wages earned on reservation). This reflects the
current federal policy favoring tribal sovereignty and self-determination which has been extant since
1968. The states' power to tax is considered preempted by federal interests-here, the maintenance
of the land mass within the reservation. If the case had arisen on a slate free of congressional
legislation, the state of Washington would have lost under the Court's own precedents regarding the
state's taxing power with respect to Indian interests on Indian reservations.
However, the slate was not clean. The broad congressional statute enacted in 1887, known as
the Dawes Act, sought to eliminate both the tribal way of life of Indian tribes and Indian reserva-
tions themselves by allotting individual plots of land to Indians, acculturating them to be yeoman
farmers, and eventually (25 years later) issuing them individual fee patents for the allotments. In
1905, the Supreme Court construed the Dawes Act to allow state taxation of allotted lands immedi-
ately upon allotment. A 1906 statute, the Burke Act, was enacted to ensure that allotted lands were
not taxed until they were released from trust ownership by the United States, i.e., until a fee patent
was issued to the Indian. At the same time, the Burke Act also allowed for expedited issuance of fee
patents prior to the expiration of the original 25-year period. Assimilation was still the clear federal
policy when the Burke Act passed. The expectation was that by the time a fee patent was issued,
Indians would be assimilated into the mainstream culture, tribalism and tribal sovereignty would be
dead, and the Indian reservations would be remembered as only a footnote in history, a temporary
holding tank on the way to the ultimate resolution of the "Indian problem."
The allotment program failed miserably and resulted in a pendulum swing in federal Indian
policy in the opposite direction with enactment of the Indian New Deal, the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934. It halted the further allotment of Indian land, halted the issuance of fee patents for
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those plots already allotted (ie., ownership remained in the United States in trust for the allottee-
beneficiary, thus preventing sale of the allotment without the consent of the government), provided
mechanisms to reacquire if possible land that had escaped Indian ownership in order to rebuild the
tribal land base, and set up a mechanism for tribes to adopt self-governance on Indian reservations.
The purpose (if not actual then one that should be normatively ascribed to it-with all due respect to
those authors who deny that there can be an articulated "purpose" to an enactment) was to promote
tribal sovereignty and to stop the disintegration of the Indian land mass, which had decreased from
138 million acres prior to the allotment program to 48 million acres.
This was not the sole policy shift in Indian policy; the pendulum swings regularly back and
forth. See DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 33-160 (2d ed.
1986) (broadly describing these historical shifts in federal Indian policy). In the 1950s, with tribal-
ism seen to be too much like communism to be comfortable, the federal policy turned once again to
assimilation-to "termination and relocation." The special trust relationship between the federal
government and several tribes was terminated, and Indians of other tribes were offered grants to
relocate from reservations to certain urban centers. The next pendulum swing came with the Nixon
administration and its policy of "self-determination." That policy remains current federal policy
toward Indians.
While the allotment program was abandoned under the 1934 Act, the Dawes Act and Burke
Act were never formally repealed. Dicta in a 1976 Supreme Court opinion agreed that the mass of
subsequent legislation repealed the Dawes Act by implication, but Justice Scalia would not recognize
the dicta under the maxim that "repeals by implication are not favored." Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 690
(quoting the non-Indian law case of Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936)). He
also believed that the Burke Act, which had not been the subject of such troublesome dicta, supplied
independent jurisdiction to tax in any event. Id. at 691. In addition to refusing to recognize the
implied repeal of the Dawes and Burke Acts due to the massive change in federal policy, Justice
Scalia considered it important that the 1934 Act did not disturb titles to already fee-patented lands
and did not return to indivisible tribal ownership the lands allotted to individuals even though it
froze them in trust indefinitely. Id. He also refused to consider the possibility that it would not be
inconsistent for fee-patented lands to be nontaxable so long as owned by Indians on Indian reserva-
tions while, at the same time, to become taxable once sold to a non-Indian (much the same as non-
Indians on Indian reservations may be taxed by the state regarding other matters even though Indi-
ans may not be so taxed under the cases cited supra). Id. Finally, Justice Scalia asserted that the
Yakima Nation's "policy objections do not belong in this forum. If the Yakima Nation believes that
the objectives of the Indian Reorganization Act are too much obstructed by the clearly retained
remnant of an earlier policy, it must make that argument to Congress." Id. at 692.
In short, Justice Scalia looked at the words of the text in isolation and a general canon of
construction in upholding Washington's right to tax, and thus to foreclose upon and take ownership
of, lands owned on the reservation by Indians who had been issued fee patents prior to the termina-
tion of the issuance of patents in favor of continued trust ownership by the federal government. The
Indian Law canon of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed favorably for the Indi-
ans based on the special trust relationship between the federal government and the tribes, see Black-
feet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 766, was no help for the Indians who were losing their land in this
case. The checkerboarding of ownership on the reservation was thus exacerbated even though tribal
economic development and wise use of the reservation land mass are important components of cur-
rent federal Indian policy. Most clearly, an originalist and textualist approach controlled. Justice
Blackmun wrote a heartfelt, but lone, dissent. Yakima, 112 S. Ct. at 694 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
The general canons of construction, though often maligned, are defensible if one thinks of them
as shorthand expressions of larger judicial values that should be observed in deciding cases. The
judicial value expressed in the general canon of construction that implied repeals of statutes are
disfavored is a sound one. Courts should be loath to conclude lightly that Congress, by a later act,
impliedly repealed an earlier act for reasons grounded in the separation of powers if nothing else.
But should that canon control in situations in which the value sought to be protected is so clearly not
implicated? Would the Court really have been stepping on Congress's toes here if it had concluded
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Congress (as reflected in legislative history) 33 as well as general policy argu-
that the tax provision, passed by an assimilationist Congress, is so out of step with the huge, vast
quantity of legislation passed since then evidencing a desire to protect Indian land from state taxa-
tion and state encroachment as well as to protect the Indian land mass that Congress should be
considered as impliedly overruling it?
Even more ironic is the majority's conclusion regarding the validity of a second tax at issue in
this case: a state excise tax on the sales of Indian fee-patented land. Scalia ruled that tax invalid
because it was not a tax on land but on the sale, and only taxes on Indian lands are authorized under
the Dawes and Burke Acts. Id. at 693-94. The more intrusive tax-the tax on the Indian land
itself-was upheld, while the less intrusive tax-the tax on the act of selling the land-was struck
down as invalid, as an impermissible intrusion on Indian self-government and self-determination. It
makes no sense.
33. Justice Scalia is best known-in the comparatively prosaic world of statutory interpreta-
tion, that is-for his extreme aversion to legislative history. While a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Scalia wrote an opinion derisively reprinting a
colloquy on the floor between Senators Armstrong and Dole in which Senator Armstrong asked
Senator Dole, then-Chairman of the Finance Committee, whether he had read the Committee Re-
port. Senator Dole responded, "I am working on it. It's not a bestseller, but I am working on it."
Hirschey v. Federal Regulatory Energy Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 & n. 1 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See Farber
& Frickey, supra note 32, at 439-42 (discussing the colloquy in greater detail to challenge the impli-
cation left by Justice Scalia in his selective quotation). His most often-cited polemic on legislative
history is that found in Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (attacking lower court's use of Senate committee report). He
did not let up in the 1991-1992 term. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S.
Ct. 2102, 2111 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I do not find its explanations persua-
sive, particularly that with respect to silencer[s], which resorts to that last hope of lost interpretive
causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction, legislative history."); Morales, 112 S.
Ct. at 2038 n.2 ("The dissent believes petitioner's position on this point to be supported by the
history and structure of the ADA (sources it deems "more illuminating" than a "narrow focus" on
the ADA's language ... ) .... ").
Armed with its warrant of textual ambiguity, the plurality conducts a search of § 5037's
legislative history to determine whether that clarifies the statute .... After all, "[a] statute
is a statute," . . . and no matter how "authoritative" the history may be-even if it is that
veritable Rosetta Stone of legislative archaeology, a crystal clear Committee Report-one
can never be sure that the legislators who voted for the text of the bill were aware of it. The
only thing that was authoritatively adopted for sure was the text of the enactment; the rest
is necessarily speculation.
United States v. R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. 1329, 1339-40 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
I join the opinion of the Court, including Parts II and III, which respond persuasively to
legislative-history and policy arguments made by respondent. It is regrettable that we have
a legal culture in which such arguments have to be addressed (and are indeed credited by a
Court of Appeals) .... [Tihe plain text of the statute should have made this litigation
unnecessary and unmaintainable.
Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Contrary to respondent's suggestion, legislative history has no bearing on the ambiguity
point. As in the Eleventh Amendment context, . . . the "unequivocal expression" of elimi-
nation of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory text. If
clarity does not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a committee report.
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 1011, 1016 (1992). Justice Stevens's dissent, which
Justice Blackmun joined, chastises the Court for "refusing to consider [the] legislative history" of the
provision at issue. Id. at 1017-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The legislative history unambiguously
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ments, viewing them both as illegitimate tools in statutory interpretation. 34 His
demonstrates that Congress intended the statute to be read literally ... The congressional purpose
to waive sovereign immunity is pellucidly clear." Id. at 1018.
Judge Breyer of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and Judge Wald of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit have separately written from the
trenches a thoughtful defense of appropriate uses of legislative history, which considers the argu-
ments against all such use, the practicalities of deciding cases, and the practicalities of the workings
of members of Congress, their staff, and groups that are affected by proposed legislation. Like most
critiques that go too far, there resonates a kernel of truth in Justice Scalia's indictment of legislative
history and judges who show an unthinking, reflexive reliance on each bit of minutia rather than sift
all the evidence, including legislative history in those cases where it is helpful and appropriate,
through the sieve of judicial reasoning. But the reaction to that kernel of truth should not be to
throw the baby out with the bathwater. (I offer all due apologies for the overabundance of meta-
phor.) "The 'problem' of legislative history is its 'abuse,' not its 'use.' Care, not drastic change, is all
that is warranted." Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 874 (1992).
Can judges not be trusted to give less weight to an isolated remark of a disgruntled legisla-
tor in a floor debate than to the words in the text itself?.
The textualists may be doing a disservice to the courts and ultimately to the public by
perpetuating the myth that our statutory construction tasks can be disposed of mechanisti-
cally in most cases and that the sheer logical force of a statute's language or internal struc-
ture can dictate our hard choices of interpretation.
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. REV. 277, 302 (1990). Professors
Farber and Frickey similarly conclude that Justice Scalia's cynicism regarding legislative history is
excessive even when the inquiry proceeds under the cynical public- choice political theory thought to
actuate Justice Scalia's views. Farber & Frickey, supra note 32, at 437-61.
There is a somewhat distinct but related point to be made regarding the use of legislative his-
tory, and that point pertains to the constraints of statutory drafting. Statutes cannot be written in
expository prose, in free-form paragraphs that tell the reader all it would like to know. Many of
those who decry the use of legislative history argue that Congress should memorialize in clear lan-
guage what it intends to do in statutory language and not rely on legislative history to make law.
While that is all well and good, it ignores the fact that much legislative history does not attempt to
make law or fill in gaps but rather tries to give a fuller description in much more readable paragraph
form of what must be written in self-executory language. When Congress writes a law exacting a
fine for certain conduct, for example, the statute simply cannot explain anything beyond the cold,
hard fact that the conduct will result in a fine. Only the legislative history can clue a reader in to
how and why Congress exercised its power to make law, answers that may help a judge understand
the law and apply it effectively if a question arises regarding its applicability in a certain fact situa-
tion. In that situation, "a crystal clear Committee Report," R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. at 1340 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), does not create the law and is not cited by the
judge as the source of the law but rather helps the judge understand the law that was in fact created
by Congress through the statutory language, drafted in its necessarily constrained form.
34. Though he referred to the "motivating policies" of a statute as an "obscure phrase" in one
case during the 1991-1992 term, R.L.C., 112 S. Ct. at 1339 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment), even Justice Scalia resorted to citing both a snippet of legislative history and a
snippet of policy during the term in construing statutes. In American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112
S. Ct. 2465, 2481 n.4 (1992), Justice Scalia cited a Senator's statement regarding a provision's pur-
pose made during hearings considering the provision. In construing the exemption found in the
Freedom of Information Act for "personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," Justice Scalia noted
that his interpretation "is in accord with the general policy of FOIA... that the particular purposes
for which a request is made are irrelevant." United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 112 S. Ct. 541, 550
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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view that such excursions beyond the statutory language entail illegitimate judi-
cial lawlessness 35 continued unabated in the 1991-1992 term: "[T]he phenome-
non calls into question whether our legal culture has so far departed from
attention to text, or is so lacking in agreed-upon methodology for creating and
interpreting text, that it any longer makes sense to talk of 'a government of laws,
not of men.' "36
Any discussion of judicial statutory interpretation in the modern -day ad-
ministrative state must consider the landmark decision in Chevron US.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. ,37 a decision for which Justice Scalia
has voiced support both in the academic literature38 and in his opinions. 39 In
Chevron, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to apply when considering
the construction of a statute by an agency charged with its interpretation.
When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter;
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative determination.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible contruction of the statute.40
The agency's answer is "permissible" so long as it is a "reasonable" construction
of the statute, not necessarily the single, correct construction. 4 1
35. Textualism subscribes to the notion of the court as an "honest agent" of the legislature.
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984). Under this conception, "[b]ackground norms, policy con-
siderations, indeed all 'outside sources,' are immaterial. The judicial task is to discern and apply a
judgment made by others, most notably the legislature. ... The agency view is usually defended by a
claim of judicial legitimacy." Sunstein, supra note 3, at 415. Professor Sunstein demonstrates that
agency theory and its formalist or literalist approach to construction is neither constitutionally com-
pelled nor will lead to "the best or most sensible system of law." Id. at 438; see also Popkin, Internal
Critique, supra note 14, at 1161-86; Zeppos, supra note 1, at 1300-35 (both critically analyzing
claims that Justice Scalia's textualism is either constitutionally compelled or prudent). But see
Mayton, supra note 9, at 133-34 (denying that Justice Scalia's textualism subscribes to agency
theory).
36. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2250 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). Cf Wisconsin
Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(ours is "a Government of laws not of committee reports").
37. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
38. See Scalia, supra note 32.
39. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
41. Id. at 843. "Of course it remains true that under Chevron, the agency will prevail even if
the court would have chosen otherwise had it been entrusted with the power to decide the issue in
the first instance." Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2071, 2093 (1990).
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Like Scalia's textualism itself,42 the Chevron decision has been glorified and
vilified, justified and critiqued on vastly different grounds. Supporters and de-
tractors have argued about whether Congress either explicitly or implicitly di-
rects courts (through the creation of ambiguity combined with the delegation of
rule-making power to an agency) to defer, whether the separation of powers
requires deference because of the accountability of the political branches, and
whether deference is merely a prudential, self-imposed limitation on the courts
based upon institutional competencies. 4 3
Others have already done a remarkable and exhaustive job of placing both
textualism and Chevron within an historical and theoretical framework and of
critiquing both their strengths and weaknesses as schools of thought. I do not
intend, therefore, to restate and reconsider broadly those arguments here.
42. Just a sampling of the articles published in recent years dealing with statutory interpreta-
tion include the articles cited supra note 8, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpreta-
tion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Robert J. Araujo, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 57 (1992); Breyer, supra
note 33; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319 (1989); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Inter-
pretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpre-
tation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007 (1989); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24;
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 3; Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Farber & Frickey, supra note 32; John Ferejohn & Barry
Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565 (1992);
Mayton, supra note 9; McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); Popkin, Internal Critique, supra note 14; Posner, supra note
3 (including a bibliographical appendix of works from Aristotle to the present); Edward L. Rubin,
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (1991); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpreta-
tion Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge is not
the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legisla-
tive History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1992); Sunstein, supra note 3; Wald, supra note 33; Zeppos,
supra note 1; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353
(1989).
43. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Ad-
ministrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 457 n.21 (1989) (collecting and discussing various sup-
porters and detractors of Chevron deference); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating
Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187, 187 n.4 (1992) (compar-
ing commentators who favor Chevron's message of deference with those troubled by it).
Professor Strauss has wondered whether deference is merely one of the tools (as is textualism
itself) used by the Supreme Court to manage its limited docket. He considers whether textualism
and Chevron are attempts to mechanize the process of statutory interpretation sufficiently to produce
substantial geographic uniformity among the thirteen circuit courts without Supreme Court review.
See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987). Professor
Strauss's theory has perhaps been borne out by the significant decrease in the caseload of the
Supreme Court since he wrote the article in 1987, including in part cases challenging the validity of
an agency action. Under Chevron, most such disputes may now be resolved more uniformly by the
lower courts, resulting in few conflicts among the circuits and fewer such agency cases reaching the
Supreme Court. See Linda Greenhouse, Court Says Accountants Can Solicit to Get Clients, N.Y.
TiMES, April 27, 1993, at A7 ("While the Court was deciding some 150 cases each term a decade
ago, it now appears that the current term will produce, at most, 97 decisions.").
TEXTUALISM & TAX CASES
Rather, this Commentary has the much more modest task of examining the con-
sequences of Justice Scalia's brand of textualism combined with his application
of Chevron in a particular context: adjudication under the Internal Revenue
Code. Part II considers Justice Scalia's combination of textualism and Chevron
in general terms by examining a tax case decided by the high court in the 1991-
1992 term: United States v. Burke.44 Using that background, the Commentary
then explores textualism, Chevron, and tax litigation in Parts III and IV through
two illustrative cases: one historical and one hypothetical.
The Commentary seeks to develop three points. First, I question the ac-
cepted wisdom that Justice Scalia is in fact an enthusiastic supporter of Chevron
deference to agencies. 45 I also question the complementary notion that textual-
ism combined with Chevron necessarily will result in "a dramatic increase in the
executive's power to make law" 46 at the expense of the legislative and judicial
branches. It may in some cases lead only to an aggrandizement of the judicial
power and a frustration of both the executive and legislative powers.
The view that Justice Scalia will defer to agency interpretations underrates
the strength and vehemence with which Justice Scalia subscribes to textualism as
an end in itself, as constituting the art of judging (whether the "judge" sits on
the bench or in an administrative agency) in the statutory case. Justice Scalia
does not appear to select the substantive result he wishes and then proceed to
interpret the text to support it. His dogma of textualism subsumes desired-or
undesired-results. 47 As Professor Popkin has shown, Scalia's method of deter-
mining when it is appropriate to defer to an agency determination is itself based
44. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
45. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 448 n. 151 (referring to "Justice Scalia's enthusiastic resort to
the principle in favor of judicial deference to agency interpretation of law"); Farina, supra note 43, at
455 ("appointment of Justice Scalia added an even more determined proponent of Chevron and the
deferential model"); id. at 460 n.42 (referring to "Justice Scalia's extreme solicitude for Chevron").
46. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 430 n.91. Others agree with Sunstein's observation. "[T]he exec-
utive branch's influence in administration of tax laws would be enhanced if Congress' [sic] ability to
spell out applications in committee reports were minimized." Bennett, supra note 8, at 110. "In
disregarding or minimizing legislative intent, judges disregard a branch of Government now con-
trolled by Democrats. The effect, in practice, is often to enhance the power of officials in the execu-
tive branch, giving these officials more leeway to interpret laws as they see fit." Robert Pear, With
Rights Act Comes Fight to Clarify Congress's Intent, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1991, at Al. "Combining
the enhancement of Presidential authority suggested by decisions like Chevron with the alteration in
congressional politics likely to result from a devaluation of legislative history works a signficant shift
in power to the President." Peter L. Strauss, Comment: Legal Process and Judges in the Real
World, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1653, 1656 (1991). "[Plart of the textualist agenda is enhanced execu-
tive power at the expense of the other branches-particularly the judicial branch." Zeppos, supra
note i, at 1334 (citing confluence of Justice Scalia's textualism with his constitutional arguments in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 698 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) in favor of greater presidential
power).
47. See Popkin, Internal Critique, supra note 14, at 1138-39 (noting "strong signs that Justice
Scalia's perspective is not narrowly focused on substantive results" but rather on his theory of statu-
tory interpretation). Others have noted that Chevron deference coupled with nonoriginalist textual-
ism allows the courts room to sanction economic deregulation, a political position with which Scalia
is deemed to agree. Note, supra note 10, at 910-11; Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2074 n.9 & 2084 n.67.
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on textualism, and it will not always lead to deferral to the agency.4"
One might argue that while Justice Scalia's rhetoric of deference to text and
deference to administrative agencies evokes a humble, subservient role for the
judiciary,49 the reality is that his brand of textualism arrogates to the judiciary a
power50 to frustrate legislative and administrative frameworks, a power to dic-
tate the terms on which legislation must be drafted-terms that seem untenable
today. If his style of statutory adjudication ever gains a solid, unyielding major-
ity on the Court, Congress must adopt one of two courses in order to avoid
frustration of its perceived statutory scheme: return to an unrealistic, pre-New
Deal style of drafting highly transitive statutes or, alternatively, draft extremely
intransitive statutes with quite broad delegations of authority to an administra-
tive agency. 51 The first sacrifices the flexibility that the administrative state em-
48. Popkin, Internal Critique, supra note 14, at 1155-59.
49. "Justice Scalia's textualism boasts a well-polished patina of respect for Congress." Herz,
supra note 8, at 1677. See supra note 35 (describing "agency" theory of textualism).
50. Cf Herz, supra note 8, at 1683 (referring to combination of textualism and Chevron as
token of "false piety toward legislative supremacy").
51. Professor Rubin effectively describes transitivity as follows:
[T]here is an enormous variation in the extent to which the legislature specifies the
effects on private parties that it wants the implementation mechanism to produce. This
variation may be described as the statute's degree of transitivity-the extent to which the
statutory directive, as articulated by the legislature, is intended to pass through the pri-
mary implementation mechanism and apply to its ultimate target. If the statute states the
precise rule that the legislature expects the mechanism to apply, it is highly transitive. In
contrast, if the statute simply instructs the mechanism to develop rules, it is entirely intran-
sitive: until the mechanism acts, the ultimate target of the statute cannot know what be-
havior the statute will require.
Statutes can be intransitive with respect to either their application or their elaboration.
A statute whose application is intransitive does not state any rule that the agency is ex-
pected to apply directly to the target; it merely instructs the agency to develop rules. The
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, for example, states the general policy that banks
should extend credit to communities from which they obtain deposits. It then instructs
various banking agencies to develop regulations to implement this policy. Since the Act
imposes no requirements at all upon the banks until the agency does so, it is totally intran-
sitive.
A statute that is transitive with respect to applicability states at least some rules that
the agency is instructed to apply directly to its ultimate target. But such statutes exhibit
varying degrees of transitivity regarding the manner in which these rules are elaborated. If
the rule is stated very broadly, the statute will continue to be intransitive, despite its direct
applicability. The Federal Trade Commission Act, for example, prohibits "unfair or de-
ceptive" trade practices. This is designed to impose some direct rules on private parties,
but it does not convey a very clear message about the content of those rules. The content
must be elaborated by the agency, through adjudication, rule making, announcements, and
advice.
From the perspective of the implementation mechanism, the statute's degree of transi-
tivity is the mechanism's degree of discretion. A highly transitive statute gives the mecha-
nism relatively little discretion, whereas an intransitive one gives it a great deal.
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 381-83
(1989) (footnotes omitted).
Though transitivity is not absolute but rather is a point on a continuum, Professor Rubin gener-
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bodies and was created to establish. 52 The second sacrifices some modicum of
control through statutory drafting (which will always be seen as limiting to a
textualist court), thereby forcing Congress to rely solely on its informal controls
of agency action to get the results it envisioned under the legislation. 53
The second point of this Commentary centers on an aspect unique to tax
law. Textualism has far-reaching consequences in the tax arena in particular-
perhaps as in no other arena-because of the fact that what is sought to be taxed
under the Internal Revenue Code is a theoretical construct larger than any- indi-
vidual policy choice or individual section of the Code. The unthinking use of
textualism can lead to wrong results in those tax cases that implicate the struc-
tural framework and integrity of the income tax. "Structural" issues are those
involving the fundamental definition of the tax base; they are those that impli-
cate the very notion of "income" under an income tax. 54 In a very real sense,
the theoretical construct we call "income" emerges as the end result of the entire
alizes that courts enforce transitive statutes whereas agencies enforce intransitive statutes. Id. at
384-85. In commenting on Professor Rubin's piece, Professor Strauss gives a very helpful compari-
son between pre-New Deal transitive legislation and modem intransitive legislation dealing with the
same topic: the development and deployment of transportation safety technology. See Peter L.
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
427, 428-30 (1989) (describing and comparing Federal Railway Safety Appliances Act of 1893 with
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act of 1966).
In connection with the Internal Revenue Code, one can easily argue that "interpretive" regula-
tions issued under the authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a), see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text,
relate essentially to transitive statutes because the basic rule is set forth in the statutory language
itself and directly applies to taxpayers, whether or not regulations are issued. "Legislative" regula-
tions, on the other hand, relate to totally intransitive statutes because until a regulation is issued,
there are no rules directly applying to taxpayers.
52. "Those who resent legislation's current role tend to look back to the halcyon days before
regulation and redistribution, when the legislature generally limited itself to drafting statutes that
courts could enforce." Rubin, supra note 51, at 395. Congress would be forced to enact evermore
lengthy statutes in an attempt to contemplate and address every factual situation that might arise.
Its institutional competence to do so in the modern era is poor: Such detail is the very stuff currently
in committee reports that Professor Livingston has argued is better left to Treasury regulations. See
Livingston, supra note 30, at 833-34. "Justice Scalia... in counseling narrow readings of statutes,
would require the legislature to enact statutes with a level of detail and specificity (and foresight)
that threatens to impair its authority to formulate legislation on the wide variety of issues con-
fronting the modem administrative state." Ferejohn & Weingast, supra note 42, at 572.
53. See Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Adminis-
trative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1251, 1319 (1992) (describing informal
controls); Strauss, supra note 46, at 1657 ("Congress is reduced to using contemporary oversight
controls-real politics but not legislative politics.").
54. "Income" under the widely cited economic definition of income-the Haig-Simons defini-
tion-means, in general terms, personal consumption and savings. See WILLIAM D. POPKIN, IN-
TRODUCTION TO FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 117-18 (1987). At its core, the Internal Revenue
Code adopts this definition. It does so by including all "accessions to wealth" over which the tax-
payer has "complete dominion," Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955), in
gross income and then allowing deductions for nonpersonal expenses incurred to produce that gross
income. What is left at the end of the process is, essentially, what is spent on personal consumption
and what is saved and not spent at all. The two structural deviations from the economic definition of
income implicit in the Internal Revenue Code are (1) gain or loss in the value of property is not
taken into account until "realized" through a disposition of the property and (2) the "imputed in-
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collection of sections contained in the Internal Revenue Code. 55 That construct
includes the notion that the same dollars should never be taxed to the same
taxpayer more than once or deducted by the same taxpayer more than once.56
Although that rule is not found in any section of the Internal Revenue Code, it
is a necessary constraint on what is sought to be taxed as "income" under the
aggregate of the sections comprising the Internal Revenue Code. The underly-
ing definition of "income" provides a structure within which interpretation must
occur, for it is "income" that we seek to reach under the Internal Revenue Code.
That definition thus provides a constraining force affecting how broadly or nar-
rowly terms in the statute should be construed.
That is, quite common words, seemingly transitive words, must sometimes
take on uncommon meanings in a particular context in order to comply with the
structural constraints of the income tax that are implicit in the Internal Revenue
Code. Courts have historically played a strong role in developing and protecting
the overarching structure of tax law through, when required, uniquely nonliteral
interpretation. 57 The discussion in connection with the Philadelphia Park58
case attempts to explain why that nonliteral interpretation is justifiable in such
cases.
Justice Scalia's brand of textualism can strip both the courts and the Treas-
ury Department of the authority to interpret common words (often the best that
Congress could have chosen in the circumstances) in uncommon fashion in or-
der to accord with the larger theoretical construct we call "income." The end
result may be a poorly administered and adjudicated statute that sacrifices sound
theory on the altar of literalism, for it is both unrealistic and undesirable to hope
that Congress will step in and correct such unthinking results in individual cases
through the enactment of legislation. The enactment of legislation was inten-
tionally made cumbersome by the Framers; it is not an appropriate vehicle
through which to adjudicate cases. (And adjudication of cases through legisla-
tion is precisely what frustration of the larger statutory scheme through abdica-
come" from owner-occupied housing and from services performed for oneself does not enter the tax
base.
The Internal Revenue Code is, of course, riddled with provisions that have nothing to do with
furthering this core definition of "income," such as the deductions for medical expenses, I.R.C.
§ 213, and personal casualty losses. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) & (h). Adjudication of issues falling outside
the "structural" framework of the income tax may well be resolved adequately using textualist tech-
niques. See infra note 147 (further describing structural issues).
55. I like to think of the myriad decisions implementing the overarching structural constraints
of the Internal Revenue Code as analogous to the decisions implementing the structural constraints
of the Constitution (i.e., the separation of powers and federalism). The source of the analysis often
lies not in the interpretation of a single clause of the Constitution (or a single section of the Internal
Revenue Code) but rather in the structural constraints implicit in the overall structure of the Consti-
tution (or Internal Revenue Code).
56. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
57. See Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 623 (1986) (reviewing tax cases in which Court has used nonliteral interpre-
tation to further coherent development of tax law). Professor Zelenak's article was written prior to
Justice Scalia's elevation to the Supreme Court.
58. See infra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
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tion of the judicial function in the guise of textualism can require Congress to
do.)
Third, I want in this Commentary to suggest the possibility that perhaps
the concerted efforts to come up with a handy dandy, one-size-fits-all approach
to statutory text are foolhardy, perhaps even wrongheaded. For all my deroga-
tory language above, I do believe that Justice Scalia's brand of textualism has its
rightful place, as do both originalism, with its reliance on original congressional
intent as evidenced by persuasive legislative history, and dynamic or evolutive
statutory interpretation, which discounts legislative history and the milieu of the
enacting Congress. 59 There are cases in which I believe their use led to the right
result, not because of the result itself but because of the context of the particular
issue and case. Might not the "single school" proponents fail to appreciate the
vastly different contexts in which ambiguity arises and must be resolved? And
might they not over-simplify the intellectual process a judge brings to bear in
resolving a case before it?
A single judge might justifiably use different approaches in different cases.
Perhaps structural constraints implicit in the notion of taxable "income," for
example, might justify nonliteral interpretation of text in the particular instance
before the court, as considered in this Commentary. If, on the other hand, a
significant, fundamental policy choice is involved, perhaps it is defensible to ad-
here to textualism and require Congress to state explicitly in statutory language
the policy choice it wishes to make rather than rely on bits of evidence in legisla-
tive history.6° Perhaps statutory issues arising in areas of law that are particu-
larly prone to wide swings in fundamental policy over time are particularly
amenable to a rejection of both originalism and textualism in favor of dynamic
statutory interpretation. 6 1 Thus, courts and agencies could further the current
federal policy without hamstringing the current litigants with disused and dis-
credited policy choices.62 And perhaps originalism, with an eye to whatever
59. See Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1497 (dynamic statutory
interpretation considers "the ongoing, not just original, history of the statute").
60. For example, Wilkinson & Volkman argue that judges should demand explicit statutory
language indicating that Congress intended to abrogate an Indian treaty by a later enactment that
conflicts with it because the policy choice to abrogate an Indian treaty is so very significant. See
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long
as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is That?, 63 CAL. L. REV. 601
(1975). A snippet of legislative history should not be pounced upon by judges as evidence that
Congress intended the later enactment thereby to abrogate treaty rights. Id. at 655-59. See infra
note 167 (quoting from article).
61. While Professor Eskridge believes that textualism is consonant with dynamic statutory in-
terpretation in that both eschew originalism, see supra note 32, I believe those open to the possibili-
ties of dynamic statutory interpretation are much more likely to be willing to consider the nontextual
context (such as current policy) than are strict textualists. See supra note 32 (discussing Yakima
Tribe tax case).
62. Virtually every area of law contains shifts in policy and includes statutes enacted in one era
and interpreted in another era. However, Indian law, because of its huge pendulum swings in policy
between the extremes of promoting tribalism and self-determination on the one hand and destroying
tribalism in favor of assimilation on the other, see supra note 32, exemplifies like no other field of law
how a court's interpretation of statutory language might discount the originalist understanding of
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evidence of legislative history is found to be persuasive, is defensible in the large
group of remaining cases: in those cases in which no signficant swings in funda-
mental policy have occurred since enactment, where no fundamental policy
choice is implicated, and where evidence of what members of Congress consid-
ered at the time of enactment might be helpful to resolve the ambiguity.
Where Justice Scalia's approach may be wrongheaded, perhaps, is in its
asserted universality, its application even in contexts to which it is not well
suited. Perhaps the real task of the wise judge is to decide which of these ap-
proaches is appropriate in deciding a particular case if, in fact, the different ap-
proaches would lead to different results.63 What makes us uncomfortable with
the notion that there may be more than one "proper" way to approach a statu-
tory issue is the apparent standardlessness, the apparent discretion it vests in
judges to reach a particular end result. The choice among these approaches
when a choice must be made may not be standardless, though. The judge is not
given unlicensed discretion if the choice is itself tethered to the nature of the
issue involved and the historical development of the particular area of law.
"Theory" need not be abandoned. Rather, which "theory" should govern the
case should be informed by context.6 4 Perhaps we ought to begin thinking about
and debating the possibility that a judge's use of different approaches in different
contexts might itself be defensible.
II. TAX REGULATIONS, JUSTICE SCALIA, AND CHEVRON
The fact that Congress enacts a fairly transitive statute, but then delegates
to an agency the authority to interpret those words in the first instance, seems to
undermine Justice Scalia's premise that at least transitive statutes have an imme-
diate meaning once one looks to the dictionary, surrounding statutory words,
and other statutes.65 Congress has done just that in connection with the Inter-
nal Revenue Code. In I.R.C. section 7805(a), Congress has directed that the
Treasury Department "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of this title, including all rules and regulations as may be necessary
by reason of any alteration of law in relation to internal revenue." This author-
ity is a general one imposed on top of the intransitive statutory mandates to
develop rules in specific instances.
the enacting Congress in order to further the current policy. "[Clourts 'are not obligated in ambigu-
ous circumstances to strain to implement [an assimilationist] policy Congress has now rejected, par-
ticularly where to do so will interfere with the present congressional approach to what is, after all, an
ongoing relationship.'" Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n. 14 (1976) (quoting Santa Rosa
Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
(1977)).
63. In many cases, a single result is dictated by several of the approaches; it is only in those
cases in which different answers would be dictated under the different approaches that the issue of
the "proper" approach to statutory language arises.
64. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Improving One's Situation: Some Pragmatic Reflections on the
Art of Judging, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 323 (1992) (discussing false dichotomy between realism
and formalism and pragmatic, if implicit, blend of both theory or "structured" analysis and contex-
tual analysis in judge's decision-making).
65. See supra note 51 (describing transitive and intransitive statutes).
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Regulations issued solely under the authority of I.R.C. section 7805(a) are
often referred to as "interpretive" regulations and make up the vast majority of
Treasury regulations. Such regulations can be thought of as an interpretation of
a fairly transitive section of the Code.66 Less often (although more frequently in
recent years, it seems), Congress delegates to the Treasury Department the au-
thority not merely to interpret rules drafted by Congress but to draft the opera-
tive rules themselves, i.e., to implement an intransitive statute. The regulations
thus issued are often referred to as "substantive" or "legislative" regulations.
For example, Congress had a devil of a time coming up with statutory rules
governing the filing of a single, consolidated tax return by a group of affiliated
corporations. Congress finally resolved the problem by enacting I.R.C. section
1502, which states:
The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as he may deem
necessary in order that the tax liability of any affiliated group of corpo-
rations making a consolidated return and of each corporation in the
group, both during and after the period of affiliation, may be returned,
determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted, in such man-
ner as clearly to reflect the income tax liability and the various factors
necessary for the determination of such liability, and in order to pre-
vent avoidance of such tax liability.
The resulting Treasury regulations 67 consist of hundreds of pages promulgating
a system that "conform[s] the applicable income tax law of the Code to the
special, myriad problems resulting from the filing of consolidated income tax
returns . "..."68
Pre-Chevron courts, at least in their rhetoric, ostensibly applied a greater
level of deference to legislative tax regulations than to interpretive tax regula-
tions issued under the authority of I.R.C. section 7805(a). The First Circuit
stated: "To sustain such a challenge to regulations promulgated under 'legisla-
66. The regulation at issue in Burke regarding the meaning of the term "personal injuries", see
infra notes 76-105 and accompanying text, is an example of an interpretive regulation of a transitive
section of the Internal Revenue Code. The Treasury Department issues nearly all of its interpretive
regulations in proposed form for public comment before issuing them in final form, even though the
Administrative Procedure Act provides an exception to the notice-and- comment rules for "interpre-
tative regulations." See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) and (d)(2) (1988).
67. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-1 to 1.1502-100.
68. American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256, 261 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (one of very few
cases invalidating a consolidated return regulation as outside power delegated to Treasury Depart-
ment because it imposed a tax on income that would not be taxed outside consolidated group).
Similarly, Congress could not decide on the definitive criteria by which to differentiate debt
from equity for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. It thus enacted I.R.C. § 385(a), which
provides: "The Secretary is authorized to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appro-
priate to determine whether an interest in a corporation is to be treated for purposes of this title as
stock or indebtedness (or as in part stock and in part indebtedness)." Subsection (b) lists several
factors that the regulations "may include" in making that determination. The Treasury Department
twice issued and twice withdrew proposed regulations under I.R.C. § 385 and has all but thrown up
its hands at further attempts. Practitioners are thus left with judicial decisions and various rulings
made by the Internal Revenue Service for guidance in advising their clients. See also I.R.C.
§§ 337(d), 338(i), 367(b), 382(m), 384(0, 453A(e), 469(l), 864(e)(7), 865(j) (each delegating substan-
tive rule-making authority to the Treasury Department in specific contexts).
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tive' authority to implement a statutory scheme is to carry a burden of 'greater
weight' than that required to overcome a routine interpretive regulation." '69 The
Supreme Court, prior to Chevron, similarly held that in reviewing the validity of
a legislative regulation the Court's "primary inquiry is whether the interpreta-
tion or method is within the delegation of authority."'70 This standard contrasts
with the lesser, though still considerably deferential, ones enunciated by the
Supreme Court in reviewing interpretive regulations issued under I.R.C. section
7805(a) prior to Chevron, L e., whether the regulation accords with the statutory
language that it interprets, whether it is in harmony with the statute's origin and
purpose, or whether it is unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the
statute.
71
Though Chevron seems to abandon the varying levels of scrutiny depending
on the regulation's status as interpretive or legislative, 72 it might not have actu-
ally worked a change in practice in tax. The reality before Chevron was that
very few Treasury Regulations-whether interpretive or legislative-had been
held invalid, notwithstanding the ostensibly different levels of scrutiny.73 As
described below, Justice Scalia's approach to Chevron, however, does seem to
resurrect this distinction in the sense that if Congress writes specifically, that is,
by writing a transitive statute, he will apply the tenets of textualism to define the
single correct meaning of the words. That meaning may very well result in in-
validation of the agency interpretation. There seems to be room for deference to
agency interpretation in Justice Scalia's jurisprudence only in the case of legisla-
tive regulations implementing broadly intransitive statutes.74
69. Merchants Nat'l Bank v. United States, 583 F.2d 19, 22 (lst Cir. 1978).
70. Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 25-26 (1982); Rowan, 452 U.S.
at 252-53; Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981); National Muffler Deal-
ers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979); Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496, 501 (1948).
72. See Farina, supra note 43, at 471 n.79 ("Chevron's articulation of the deferential model
appears to be indifferent to the 'legislative'/'interpretive' rule construct."). But see Herz, supra note
43, at 190 (arguing that Chevron does not require acceptance of interpretive regulations but does
require acceptance of agency lawmaking through legislative regulations). Cf Rubin, supra note 51,
at 383 (arguing that "statute's degree of transitivity is the mechanism's degree of discretion").
73. American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256 (Ct. Cl. 1979), was so newsworthy
in the tax world, see supra note 68, because it did result in the invalidation of a legislative regulation.
74. Professor Herz concludes that this result is in fact the correct reading of Chevron and the
right result. The validity of interpretive regulations pertaining to a transitive statute will most often
be resolved under Chevron's step one. If the regulation accords with the detailed statute, it will be
upheld. If not, it will not be, for it is the judge's duty to say what the law is when Congress provides
sufficient detail. Step two of the Chevron analysis is never broached except in the case of legislative
regulations interpreting a broadly intransitive statute. See Herz, supra note 43. It is ironic to note,
however, that the conclusion that Justice Scalia's combination of textualism and Chevron resurrects
in practice the differing levels of deference depending on the transitivity of the statute (i.e., depend-
ing on the status of the regulation as more purely "legislative" or "interpretive") is contrary to his
own words that such a distinction did not survive Chevron. "In an era when our treatment of agency
positions is governed by Chevron, the 'legislative rules vs. other action' dichotomy.., is an anachro-
nism." EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
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Justice Scalia has not been a frequent author of tax opinions. 75 Yet, in the
1991-1992 term he penned a separate concurrence in a tax case that forcefully
demonstrates both his textualist methodology and the application of that meth-
odology under Chevron in the tax arena. The issue in United States v. Burke 76
was whether an award of back wages was received "on account of personal inju-
ries or sickness" within the meaning of section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code and thus could be excluded from gross income. 77 The plaintiffs were wo-
men employed by the Tennessee Valley Authority who filed a class-action suit
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging sex-based discrimina-
tion in pay schedules. The Authority settled the suit by establishing a $5 million
fund from which the payments at issue were made. The Sixth Circuit held that
the amounts received were excludable under I.R.C. section 104(a)(2), but the
Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, reversed. 78
The regulation pertaining to section 104(a)(2) defines an amount received
on account of personal injuries as "an amount received.., through prosecution
of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights."' 79 The Courts of
Appeals and Tax Court never disputed the validity of the regulation but did
disagree among themselves over whether an award of back wages alone could
ever constitute an award for personal injuries. Such disagreements arose not
only in sex- discrimination cases but in other actions as well, including actions
for race and age discrimination and violation of First-Amendment rights.
Under the origin-of-the- claim approach common in tax law,80 most courts
had concluded by the time Burke was decided by the high court that the focus in
such cases must concentrate on the nature of the injury, not on the derivative
consequences (including loss of otherwise taxable wages or business profits) of
that injury, in determining whether the "suit or action [was] based upon tort or
tort-type rights." Under that view, defamation (not only of personal reputation
but of business reputation as well), discrimination on the basis of sex, race, and
age, as well as violations of civil rights that resulted in awards were all consid-
75. But see Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Commissioner v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring). In recent years, the most frequent authors of tax opinions are Justice
Blackmun and, until his retirement, Justice Marshall.
76. 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
77. Id. at 1868.
78. Burke v. United States, 929 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992).
79. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c).
80. The origin-of-the-claim test is the nominal test that has controlled not only inquiries re-
garding excludability under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) but also inquiries regarding whether the nexus be-
tween an expense and either a trade or business or other income-producing activity is close enough
to justify deduction of the expense under I.R.C. § 162 or § 212 or whether the expense is a nonde-
ductible personal one under I.R.C. § 262. See United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963) (ruling
legal expenses incurred during divorce nondeductible even though result of litigation might have
required disposition of income-producing assets). It also governs the similar inquiry into whether
the nexus between an expense and medical treatment is close enough to justify deduction of the
expense under I.R.C. § 213 or whether the expense is a nondeductible personal one. See Ochs v.
Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir.) (ruling children's education expenses nondeductible even
though incurred on doctor's suggestion in connection with mother's illness), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
827 (1952).
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ered to be injuries to the dignity of a person, a breach of a duty imposed by law,
independent of contract, sounding in tort.8 ' This was, in fact, the approach
taken by the Sixth Circuit in ruling that the award in Burke was excludable.8 2
The Fourth Circuit had adopted a different approach to I.R.C. section 104(a)(2).
That court did not disagree that the origin of the claim controlled, but it was
swayed in similar cases by the nature of the award as back wages-what would
otherwise have been taxable if received in the ordinary course-and concluded
that such actions sounded more in contract than tort. The Fourth Circuit there-
fore concluded that such awards should not be excludable. 83
While agreeing with the Fourth Circuit that such awards should not be
excluded, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Burke took a new approach by
concentrating on the scope of the limited remedial relief available under the stat-
81. See, e.g., Redfield v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 940 F.2d 542 (1991) (age discrimination); Pistillo
v. Commissioner, 912 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1990) (age discrimination); Rickel v. Commissioner, 900
F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1990) (age discrimination); Byrne v. Commissioner, 883 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1989)
(retaliatory discharge for reporting to EEOC); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842 (10th Cir.
1989); Bent v. Commissioner, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987) (violation of free-speech rights); Roemer v.
Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983) (defamation of business reputation); Stocks v. Commis-
sioner, 98 T.C. 1 (1992) (race discrimination); Downey v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 150 (1991) (en
banc) (age discrimination); Metzger v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 834 (1987) (sex and national-origin
discrimination); Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986) (en banc), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th
Cir. 1988) (defamation of business reputation). The Threlkeld case was heard en banc because the
Tax Court abandoned its prior practice of looking to what the damage award replaced in determin-
ing whether the award was made on account of "personal injuries" in the case of nonphysical inju-
ries and instead adopted the origin- of-the claim test. The Downey case was heard en bane because it
reversed the Tax Court's prior position in Rickle v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 510 (1989), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 655 (1990), and Pistillo v. Commissioner, T.C.M. 1989 -329, that back wages
in discrimination cases evidence an award originating more in contract than in tort under the origin-
of-the claim test.
82. Burke, 929 F.2d at 1121-24. It was also the approach maintained by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas in their dissent, which similarly concluded that the award in Burke should be excludable.
See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1849-80 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. See Thompson v. Commissioner, 866 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (award of back wages under
Title VII and the Equal Pay Act held taxable). In her Burke dissent, Justice O'Connor, citing the
often-cited case of Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), aff'd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988), reminded the majority that the largest component of an award in the case of physical injury
resulting in a traditional tort suit (Le., the prototypical "personal injury") might also be back and
future wages which would have been taxable absent the injury. See 112 S. Ct. at 1880 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Yet, such an award is excludable under the authority of § 104(a)(2) without question.
Thus, the inquiry regarding whether the amounts would have been taxable if received in the ordinary
course absent an injury is not helpful. See also infra note 93 (describing difficulty in articulating
justification for exclusion which makes analysis of its meaning difficult).
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had taken a tack completely
different from all these other courts: It concluded that an action under Title VII originated in eq-
uity, not in law, and that therefore there were no "damages" received within the meaning of
§ 104(a)(2) because "damages" was a term of art pertaining only to actions at law. Sparrow v.
Commissioner, 949 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Justice O'Connor mentioned and disagreed with this
approach in her dissent. "The IRS defines 'damages' to include a 'legal suit or action based upon tort
or tort type rights.' 26 CFR § 1.104-1(c) (1991) (emphasis added). This inclusive definition renders
the historical incidents of 'actions at law' and 'suits in equity' irrelevant to the proper interpretation
of § 104(a)(2)." Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1881 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ute at the time of the action: an award of back wages and appropriate injunctive
relief. "Nothing in this remedial scheme purports to recompense a Title VII
plaintiff for any of the other traditional harms associated with personal injury,
such as pain and suffering, emotional distress, harm to reputation, or other con-
sequential damages (e.g., a ruined credit rating)."' 84 Positing that "one of the
hallmarks of traditional tort liability is the availability of a broad range of dam-
ages to compensate the plaintiff 'fairly for injuries caused by the violation of his
legal rights,' "85 the majority concluded that the limited remedial focus of Title
VII claims removed them from the realm of claims based on tort-like personal
injury.8 6 Thus, in determining whether the action sounded more in contract
than in tort, the Court took a different approach from the Fourth Circuit.
Rather than look to see whether the amount recovered would have been taxable
in the ordinary course absent the action, the court instead looked to the breadth
of relief available under the statute and held that it must be sufficiently broad in
scope, as is the scope of relief in common-law torts, for the action to be based
upon a "tort-type" right within the meaning of the regulation.
The validity of the regulation's approach was not argued in either the lower
courts or the Supreme Court. Each court accepted the guidance offered by the
regulation, which was promulgated in 1960; they disagreed only with respect to
whether an action under Title VII was a "tort-like" action. Yet, notwithstand-
ing the lack of argument on the issue, Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring
opinion, concluded that the regulation's definition of "damages received on ac-
count of personal injuries or sickness" as "an amount received ... through pros-
ecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort or tort-type rights" was not
entitled to deference under Chevron because "the IRS's 'tort rights' formulation
... is not within the range of reasonable interpretation of the statutory text."' 8 7
He relied on the "critical factor" of the juxtaposition of "personal injuries" with
the term "sickness" in concluding that the term "personal injuries" refers only
to physical injuries and "perhaps" to injuries to a person's mental health,8 8 not
to tort-like injuries to the dignity of a person.8 9 "The term 'sickness' connotes a
'[d]iseased condition; illness; [or] ill health,' Webster's New International Dic-
tionary 2329-2330 (2d ed. 1950), and I think that its companion must similarly
be read to connote injuries to physical (or mental) health" 90 Thus, the only
84. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1873.
85. Id. at 1871 (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 (1978) (emphasis added)).
86. The issue will undoubtedly have to be litigated again in view of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which, as Justice Blackmun noted, provides that "victims of intentional discrimination are
entitled to a jury trial, at which they may recover cofmipensatory damages for 'future pecuniary
losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses,' as well as punitive damages." Id. at 1874 n.12 (quoting Civil Rights Act of
1991). In view of the expansion of the remedial scope of the statute, the opinion at least implies that
a plaintiff able to show intentional discrimination under the new law will now be entitled to exclude
the entire award from income under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
87. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1875 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
88. See id. at 1875-76.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1875. The passage continues: "It is almost as odd to believe that the first part of the
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"reasonable" or "permissible" construction of the statute by the agency is one
that conforms to Justice Scalia's textualist reading of the words, which defines
personal injuries as encompassing only physical, and perhaps mental-health,
injuries.
Justice Scalia's approach in Burke is illustrative for several reasons. First,
he found the regulation invalid without argument or consideration by the parties
themselves or any other court, demonstrating the extent to which he will go in
pursuit of textualism.9 ' The case also demonstrates that his publicly stated re-
gard for Chevron will not result in deferral to an agency's construction of the
statute as often as one might imagine in view of his kind words for Chevron .92
His textual approach to both steps under Chevron renders Chevron deference
difficult for him.
Under the first step, the inquiry is whether Congress has spoken directly on
the matter, i.e., is there really an ambiguity? His nontextualist colleagues on the
Court will look to extra-textual indications, including legislative history, in de-
termining whether an ambiguity exists when the law is sought to be applied to
the particular facts before the Court; Justice Scalia will not.9 3 He looks solely to
phrase 'personal injuries or sickness' encompasses defamation, as it would be to believe that the first
part of the phrase 'five feet, two inches' refers to pedal extremities." Id. He also argued that the
term "personal injuries" used in companion subsections must be read as limited to physical injuries;
thus use of the term in section (a)(2) must be similarly limited. Id. at 1876.
91. Justice Scalia reasoned:
I must acknowledge that the basis for reversing the Court of Appeals on which I rely has
not been argued by the United States, here or below. The rule that points not argued will
not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; its observance, at least
in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our adversary system of justice from the inquisi-
torial one. Even so, there must be enough play in the joints that the Supreme Court need
not render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is apparent on the
face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it-particularly when the judgment
will reinforce error already prevalent in the system. I think that is the case here.
Id. at 1877 (citations omitted).
92. See Scalia, supra note 32; supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
93. Except for the legislative activity in 1989 described in the text, see infra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text, legislative history is not much help here in gleaning the meaning of the words
"personal injuries." There is none. Similarly, consideration of the "purpose" behind the exclusion
reaps no rewards; its purpose is difficult to articulate.
The lack of an apparent purpose for the exclusion is one reason why it has been so difficult for
courts to determine whether an award is received on account of "personal injuries," as identifiable
purpose can inform interpretation. Many of the components of an award, whether the injury is
physical or nonphysical (e.g., defamation), constitute sums that would have been taxable business
profits or wages in the ordinary course had the injury not occurred. That the amounts were con-
verted into a damage award involuntarily is not a persuasive factor for exclusion in the case of a
damage award not relating to a personal injury; forced realizations are nonetheless taxable. See
Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (1st Cir.) (in absence of statutory provi-
sion providing otherwise, damages are treated for tax purposes according to what they were awarded
to replace; thus compensation for lost profits is taxable while compensation for damage to goodwill is
analyzed as property disposition), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 779 (1944). Even awards for pain and
suffering constitute an "accession to wealth, clearly realized, over which the taxpayer has complete
dominion." Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (concluding that puni-
tive damages received in antitrust action are taxable). Most commentators conclude that a simple
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the text in determining whether ambiguity exists. Because he does so, he has
parted with his colleagues in several cases in which they found ambiguity and
proceeded to the second Chevron step: considering whether the agency's inter-
pretation of the ambiguous statute was "reasonable," though not necessarily the
single correct construction. 94 If Justice Scalia finds no ambiguity under the first
step using his textualist analysis, he will not go on to the second Chevron step.
Justice Scalia ostensibly viewed Burke as requiring analysis under the sec-
ond Chevron step, though his textualist result could easily have been placed
under the first Chevron step. Because of the words surrounding the term "per-
sonal injuries," he in essence found no ambiguity in the term. However, he did
couch Burke in second-step jargon-whether the agency interpretation was
"reasonable"-and showed us that he will apply textualist methods to this step
as well. Such an approach severely limits the range of material available to
agencies in construing statutes in a "reasonable" fashion, for it ignores such
extra-textual material as legislative history, prior rulings and cases, and prior
legislative activity. Thus, agencies are restricted regarding the sources they can
use in drafting regulations that will pass "reasonableness" muster.
Justice Scalia did not discuss the acceptance of the standard itself by nu-
merous other courts (the disagreements centering only on its application). Nor
did he discuss the Internal Revenue Service's own longstanding ruling that dam-
ages for alienation of affection, damages for slander or libel of a personal charac-
ter, and money received by a parent in consideration of the surrender of his right
"suffered enough" principle must be at work, as in the exclusion in I.R.C. § 101(b) of up to $5,000 of
employee death benefit payments made to the beneficiary of a deceased employee by the deceased's
employer. If the purpose of I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) were more easily grasped, the scope of its meaning
could be similarly better grasped. See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Personal Injury Compensation
as a Tax Preference, 37 ME. L. REV. 1, 5 n.9 (1985) (describing the lack of historical evidence
explaining I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)'s exclusion); Robert J. Henry, Torts and Taxes, Taxes and Torts: The
Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 23 Hous. L. REV. 701, 723-29 (1986) (describing various
purported justifications). For that reason, perhaps a narrower construction of the exclusion over the
years would have been wiser. Cf. Popkin, infra note 105 (advocating that Congress should decide
once and for all extent to which it wishes awards for nonphysical injuries to be excludable).
94. See, e.g., Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2539 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (using textualist methodology, disagreeing with majority's conclusion that statutory ambiguity
existed and that deference to agency was warranted); Maislin Indus. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S.
116, 136 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (using textualist methods to overturn agency's construction
of statute in adjudication, rather than through regulation); Department of the Treasury v. Federal
Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 928-34 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (using textualist methods to overturn
agency's construction of statute in adjudication, rather than through regulation); Pittston Coal
Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113-20 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (using textualist methods to invalidate
regulation, an analysis which Justice Stevens's lengthy dissent, in calling for deference to the agency,
termed "rather superficial"); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 318 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (using textualist methods to invalidate regulations); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority's conclu-
sion that statutory text was unambiguous and thus deferral to agency was inappropriate but dis-
agreeing that it was proper to consult legislative history in determining whether ambiguity existed).
See also Sunstein, supra note 41, at 2089 n.89 (describing a similar textualist approach to Chevron's
two prongs in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which resulted
in failing to defer to an agency's "fully sensible administrative initiative").
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to the custody of his minor child are all excludable as damages received on ac-
count of personal injury.95
Similarly, his attempt to deal with recent legislative activity shedding some
light on the matter was not altogether persuasive. In 1989, the House passed,
but Congress ultimately rejected, a bill that would have amended the statute to
limit the exclusion to damages received on account of "physical injury or physi-
cal sickness" instead of "personal injuries or sickness."' 96 The Senate bill had no
comparable provision. The House-Senate Conference agreed to leave the term
"personal injuries" intact but also agreed to amend the statute specifically to
disallow exclusion of punitive damages received on account of nonphysical inju-
ries or sickness. 9 7 Thus, the legislation implicitly affirmed, by retaining the gen-
eral rule that "personal" injuries result in excludable awards and coupling it
with the new amendment providing that punitive damages not received on ac-
count of "physical" injury were not excludable, that compensatory damages for
nonphysical yet "personal" injuries of the type long held excludable by numer-
ous courts (such as defamation and violation of First-Amendment rights in addi-
tion to discrimination suits) continued to be excludable.
Justice Scalia stated that the amendment merely confirmed that some
mental-health injuries may come within the term "personal injuries."' 98 Because
he did not discuss the numerous cases and rulings allowing exclusion for non-
physical yet personal injuries, he did not explain how Congress's amendment
succeeded in changing the law so that those cases would now be decided differ-
ently. If Congress intended in passing the amendment to overturn the "tort-
like" test in the regulation for compensatory damages (in addition to disallowing
exclusion for punitive damages received on account of nonphysical injuries) and
to instruct that the term "personal injuries" excludes injuries not involving a
physical or mental-health assault (i.e., that it wished to overturn the results of
all the cases allowing exclusion of compensatory damages for injuries resulting
from defamation, discrimination, and violation of civil rights), it chose language
singularly inapt to convey that message. Only the rejected House language
would have done that. That message is clear only to Justice Scalia. 99 The ma-
jority, in a footnote, relied on the long history of acceptance of the "tort-like"
test, coupled with the recent legislative activity both affirmatively rejecting limi-
tation of the term "personal injuries" to physical injuries and affirmatively rec-
ognizing through the punitive damage provision that "personal" is not confluent
95. Sol. Op. 132, I-I C.B. 92, 93-94 (1922). This ruling reversed the position taken in a 1920
ruling that "personal injuries" are limited to "physical injuries." See S. 1384, 2 C.B. 71, 71-72
(1920).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 101-247, 101st Cong., ist Sess., at 1354-55 (describing proposed
§ 11641 of H.R. 3299, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989)).
97. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (last sentence). See generally Deborah A. Geier, The So-Called "Legis-
lative Reenactment" Doctrine, 55 TAX NoTEs 1549, 1553 n.22a (1992) (Letter to the Editor) (dis-
cussing Burke in connection with legislative reenactment doctrine).
98. See Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1876 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. He stated: "[O]ne has little doubt what was intended, and it is not recovery for defamation
(or other invasions of 'personal' interests that do not, of necessity, harm the victim's physical or
mental health)." Id. at 1876.
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with "physical," in dismissing Justice Scalia's attack on the validity of the
regulation. 1oo
Justice Scalia's refusal to demur to the executive branch's interpretation of
the statutory language if that interpretation differs from his own parsing of the
language diminishes the force of many commentators' predictions that Scalia's
textualism coupled with Chevron would necessarily strengthen the executive
branch. 10 1 Rather, Justice Scalia's brand of textualism seems to strengthen only
the judge's own power to impose on the executive branch what he or she believes
to be the single, proper interpretation of the words 0 2-regardless of the execu-
tive branch's interpretation of the provision- so long as the provision at issue is
sufficiently transitive. While Scalia glorifies Chevron in principle, his practice of
severely limiting the tools he will use in determining both ambiguity and reason-
ableness appears to undermine it in those instances where Congress enacts a
transitive statute. His approach vests in the textualist judge the sole power to
construe anew statutes he or she considers sufficiently precise to call for textual-
ist techniques, even when the statute is administered by an agency. Thus, if
Congress writes specifically enough to satisfy a textualist that the words can
mean only one thing, the agency's interpretation is ignored. Burke exemplifies
the less-often-cited paragraph of the same article in which Justice Scalia sings
the praises of Chevron deference
I cannot resist the temptation to tie this lecture into an impenetrable
whole, by observing that where one stands on this last point-how
clear is clear-may have much to do with where one stands on the
earlier points of what Chevron means and whether Chevron is desira-
ble. In my experience, there is a fairly close correlation between the
degree to which a person is (for want of a better word) a "strict con-
structionist" of statutes, and the degree to which that person favors
Chevron and is willing to give it broad scope. The reason is obvious.
One who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a statute is
apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron
deference exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me
to accept an interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not per-
sonally adopt. Contrariwise, one who abhors a "plain meaning" rule,
and is willing to permit the apparent meaning of a statute to be im-
100. See id. at 1871 n.6 (Blackmun, J.)
101. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
102. Thus, Justice Scalia's performance in Burke deviates from Professor Strauss's conception
of Chevron:
The problem lies in the use of the word "deference" to describe what is to occur at the
second stage. That usage suggests an ultimate judicial responsibility for the outcome that
the analysis in Chevron in other respects repudiates. Acceptance subject to reasonableness
review, not deference, is the necessary posture here. A change not well explained might be
rejected as unreasonable and returned to the agency for further consideration; but one
would never reach the point at which a court, declining to defer to the agency's view, supplied
its own meaning for the statute.
Strauss, supra note 43, at 1126 (emphasis added). In rejecting the agency's interpretation, Justice
Scalia set forth what he believes to be the sole "reasonable" interpretation of the words at issue.
1993]
TEMPLE LAW REVIEW
peached by the legislative history, will more frequently find agency-
liberating ambiguity, and will discern a much broader range of "rea-
sonable" interpretation that the agency may adopt and to which the
courts must pay deference. The frequency with which Chevron will
require that judge to accept an interpretation he thinks wrong is infi-
nitely greater. 
10 3
Thus, Justice Scalia does not mind Chevron deference because he will not
often find it necessary to defer, certainly not as often as proponents of Chevron
thought he would. In those cases in which he will not go on to consider the
"reasonableness" of the agency's interpretation because he finds certainty under
step one, the next point to stress is his textualist approach to determining what
that certainty is. In that analysis, with the agency out of the picture, Congress is
also out of the picture in the sense that Scalia will not look to legislative history
and other indicia of context and policy surrounding the enactment of the legisla-
tion. His interpretation thus might be different from both how the agency inter-
prets the text at issue and how another judge who looks to legislative history
might interpret the text at issue. Thus both Congress and the executive branch
are diminished. It is this combination of Chevron and textualism that leads to
very little deference to either Congress or the executive branch in those cases in
which Congress writes specifically enough for Justice Scalia to decide that the
statute's meaning is self-apparent. Justice Scalia, in short, exalts the judge's
power to define the single correct meaning of a transitive statute's text at the
expense of the power of both Congress (through refusal to consider relevant
legislative history and context) and agencies (through refusal to look beyond the
text in determining either ambiguity or the "reasonable" interpretation of the
words), notwithstanding his assertedly humble posture that his textualism di-
minishes judicial power.
Such an approach did no damage in Burke itself. His concurrence failed to
carry a single other vote. More important, the foggy purpose and minimal scope
of the provision' ° 4 would have meant that little, if any,10 5 damage would have
been done to the structural integrity of the Internal Revenue Code even if his
view had carried the day. But Justice Scalia's brand of textualism can lead to
serious distortions in those cases that, like Burke, deal with transitive language
but that, unlike Burke, go to the heart of the structure of the tax law.
III. "COST" AS STRUCTURAL MECHANISM
I chose the example discussed below-the meaning of "cost" in I.R.C. sec-
tion 1012-not necessarily because it is of overwhelming significance but rather
because it exemplifies why the structural integrity of the Internal Revenue Code
103. Scalia, supra note 32, at 521 (some emphasis added; some emphasis in original).
104. See supra note 93 (describing the difficulty in ascribing a purpose or justification for the
exclusion).
105. See William D. Popkin, The Tax Treatment of Statutory Torts, 54 TAX NoTES 1570
(1992) (Letter to the Editor) (urging Justices to do essentially what Justice Scalia did in order to
force Congress to decide once and for all extent to which it wishes damages for nonphysical injuries
to be excludable).
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sometimes requires a nonliteral interpretation of seemingly transitive language.
Many more examples could have been added t° 6 (and for those who read foot-
notes, two more short examples are given 07). But I started this Commentary
106. See, e.g., examples discussed in Zelenak, supra note 57.
107. One short example in which textualism frustrated the structural integrity of the concept of
"income" is the case of Adolph Coors Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351 (1968). The
taxpayer in that case was held to be entitled to exclude the value of lodgings provided him by his
"employer"-essentially a wholly owned corporation-under I.R.C. § 119. Id. at 1363. Section
119 provides for an exclusion "from the gross income of an employee the value of any. . . lodging
furnished to him ... on behalf of his employer for the convenience of the employer .... The
convenience- of-the-employer requirement is interpreted in the regulations as one requiring that the
lodgings be furnished for a "substantial noncompensatory business reason." See Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.119-1(a)(2) and 1.119-1(b). The court concluded that the presence of Coors on his factory
grounds, on which the house owned by the corporation was located, was necessary for the smooth
functioning of the business. See Coors, 27 T.C.M. at 1363. Thus, he was entitled to exclude the
value of the free lodgings, which the corporation itself deducted as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense. Id.
The court thus approached the statutory language and regulations literally, losing sight of the
structural reason that justifies I.R.C. § 119 in the first place. That justification is very important
when one recalls that the tax base is intended to encompass, in general, core personal consumption,
such as the cost of meals and lodgings. See supra note 54. The disallowance of a deduction for
personal expenses under I.R.C. § 262 ensures, in general, that meals and lodgings are purchased
with after-tax dollars. Because an exclusion is the economic equivalent to an inclusion followed by a
full deduction, we have to be concerned about the justification for the exclusion under I.R.C. § 119.
Horizontal equity-the notion that similarly situated taxpayers ought to be treated similarly-de-
mands sound justification for any provision that allows some taxpayers tax-free personal consump-
tion that the rest of the taxpaying world must purchase with after-tax dollars.
Then-judge (now Justice) Kennedy described the structural premise of the exclusion as follows:
[T]he underlying principle is the idea that forced consumption should in some cases be
treated as a transaction that is not dependent on significant elements of personal choice.
That is, if the convenience of the employer dictates a certain type of consumption that is
likely to be different from that which a taxpayer would normally prefer, this restriction of
the taxpayer's preference is an occasion for an "accession to wealth" over which the tax-
payer does not "have complete dominion." Cf Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426, 431 ... (1955) (defining gross income in terms of quoted phrases.)
Sibla v. Commissioner, 611 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1980) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
that cash reimbursements for meal expenses of firemen could be excluded from income under au-
thority of I.R.C. § 119).
The Tax Court judge in Coors lost sight of that animating justification, which is based on struc-
tural notions central to the concept of the tax base. The idea that this employee accepted lodging
that he would not have chosen freely, that the lodging was chosen by his employer who required him
to live in it for sound business reasons and thus should not be taxable because of the employee's
abridgement of freedom, loses all luster when one accepts the reality that a corporation and his sole
shareholder have only one mind. The court, in short, "applied [the phrases] in a sterile manner, cut
off from the structural principles which underlie the statute." POPKIN, supra note 54, at 175. Cf
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-34-003 (May 6, 1991) (rejecting argument that I.R.C. § 269 disallowed deduc-
tion of meals and lodgings paid by wholly owned farming corporation while conceding that family
could exclude value of meals and lodging from gross income under I.R.C. § 119).
Similarly, a textual approach to language can lose sight of the underlying structural principle at
stake when debt that is not collected because it is "unenforceable" is held not to result in income
from the "discharge of indebtedness" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 61(a)(12). Debt that cannot be
"enforced," the argument goes, cannot be "discharged." Focusing on whether the debt is "enforcea-
ble" loses sight of the structural underpinnings of debt-discharge income. The inclusion of income
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with the desire to keep it at a manageably short length (a goal already becoming
elusive), and I believe the example discussed in the text illustrates my point
sufficiently.
The case of Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States 108 is often
used in Basic Tax textbooks'0 9 in part because it demonstrates most clearly how
even ordinary terms-probably the best that Congress could have chosen-must
sometimes assume a counterintuitive meaning in order to protect the structural
integrity of the income tax. In order to determine proper depreciation and loss
deductions due to abandonment, the corporate taxpayer in Philadelphia Park
needed to ascertain its original basis in intangible property, which I shall call the
Railway Franchise. The taxpayer did not originally purchase the Railway
Franchise for cash but rather obtained it in a taxable exchange for other prop-
erty, which I shall call the Strawberry Bridge. The basis rule, then and now,
provides that "the basis of property shall be the cost of such property" unless
another of the several specific basis rules in the Internal Revenue Code ap-
plies 110 (which did not). Thus, the original basis of the Railway Franchise was
its "cost."
What does the term "cost" mean? How much did the Railway Franchise
"cost" the taxpayer? The word seems straightforward enough. The current reg-
ulation provides: "In general, the basis of property is the cost thereof. The cost
is the amount paid for such property in cash or other property.""II If you took
a survey on the street, I bet most people asked would say that the Railway
Franchise cost the taxpayer in Philadelphia Park the value with which it had to
part in order to obtain it, i.e., the fair market value of the Strawberry Bridge
given in exchange for the Railway Franchise. That is the economic outlay with
which the taxpayer parted, i.e., the "amount paid for such property in cash or
from the discharge of indebtedness rests on the tax- benefit rationale. The current structural decision
implicit in the income tax is that loan proceeds are excluded from gross income when received on the
premise that the borrowed dollars would be repaid to the creditor with after-tax dollars. In this way,
taxation of loan proceeds is merely deferred until repayment. When repayment fails to transpire
because, for example, the creditor is disallowed from enforcing the debt (e.g., under a state usury
law), the debtor realizes income in order to account for the fact that the prior assumption, justifying
the original exclusion of what would otherwise have been a taxable accession to wealth at that time,
proved to be false. There may be other reasons for failing to charge a taxpayer with income on what
appears to be a discharge of indebtedness, but "unenforceability" of the debt is not one of them.
"Such a reliance on the dictionary definition of words focuses on nonissues that arise because of an
excessive solicitude to the perceived exactitude of the meaning of words severed from their structural
context as part of the Internal Revenue Code." Deborah A. Geier, Tufts and the Evolution of Debt-
Discharge Theory, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 115, 169 (1992). See also id. at nn.l 14-15 and accompanying
text, n.167, n.217 (discussing same point).
108. 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
109. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1095-1100 (4th
ed. 1991); J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 80-82 (2d
ed. 1992); JAMES J. FREELAND, STEPHEN A. LIND, & RICHARD B. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 124-27 (7th ed. 1991); ALAN GUNN & LARRY D. WARD, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 520-22 (3d ed. 1992); POPKIN, supra note 54, at 89-91.
110. See I.R.C. § 1012. It was numbered § 113(a) at the time the case was decided.
111. Treas. Reg. § 1.1012-1(a).
[Vol. 66
TEXTUALISM & TAX CASES
other property" in the words of the regulation, in order to "purchase" the prop-
erty. The court itself in Philadelphia Park noted that "[t]he view that 'cost' is
the fair market value of the property given is predicated on the theory that the
cost to the taxpayer is the economic value relinquished."' 12 Thus, if the "ordi-
nary meaning" and "natural reading" of the term "cost" as it is "commonly
understood" 1 13 controlled the inquiry, the taxpayer's original basis in the Rail-
way Franchise would have been the fair market value of the Strawberry Bridge
given in exchange for it.
Yet, the court held otherwise. The court held that the "cost" basis of the
Railway Franchise must be the fair market value of the franchise itself on the
date obtained in the exchange, and it so held because of the fundamental role
that basis plays in the income tax." 4 "The view that 'cost' is the fair market
value of the property received is based upon the theory that the term "cost" is a
tax concept and must be considered in light of... the prime role that the basis of
property plays in determining tax liability."' "15
The fundamental role of basis as a structural mechanism is to ensure that
two fundamental precepts are not violated: "(1) The same dollars should not be
taxed to the same taxpayer more than once; and (2) The same dollars should not
be deducted by the same taxpayer more than once." ' 1 6 Basis, in general, is a
running record of amounts that have already been subject to tax and should not
be taxed again. Thus, when Taxpayer A earns $83,333 of gross income on
which he pays $23,333 in tax (being in the twenty-eight percent bracket), con-
verts the remaining $60,000 cash into property by purchasing Blackacre, and
sells Blackacre for $100,000, he realizes and is taxed on only $40,000 of new
wealth. 117 The $60,000 in dollar bills would never have been subject to tax
again had they not been converted into property, and thus they should not be
taxed again when the property is sold for $100,000.11s
Assume that the Strawberry Bridge originally owned by the taxpayer in
Philadelphia Park and exchanged for the Railway Franchise had a fair market
value of $100 and basis of $50 at the time of the original exchange. Assume also
that the fair market value of the Railway Franchise received by the taxpayer in
exchange for the Strawberry Bridge had a fair market value of $125 at the time
of the exchange. (Such unequal exchanges do occur.) The taxpayer would have
realized and recognized $75 of gain, consisting of the $50 unrealized gain em-
bedded in the Strawberry Bridge as well as the additional new wealth of $25
consisting of the difference in value between the Strawberry Bridge and the Rail-
way Franchise.
Now assume the taxpayer immediately sold the Railway Franchise for $125
in cash, and this is the transaction before the court. The difference between the
112. Philadelphia Park, 126 F. Supp. at 188.
113. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
114. Philadelphia Park, 126 F. Supp. at 189.
115. Id. at 188.
116. JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LoGic OF TAX 20 (1989) (emphasis in original).
117. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) and § 1001.
118. The example is taken from POPKIN, supra note 54, at 89-91.
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$125 amount realized on the sale and the taxpayer's basis in the Railway
Franchise would constitute gain or loss under I.R.C. section 1001. If the tax-
payer were to take a cost basis of $100 for the Railway Franchise under the
common definition of the word "cost," which is the "amount paid" by the tax-
payer, it would recognize $25 of gain. But that gain would consist of the $25
difference in value between the two pieces of property on which the taxpayer
already paid tax on the initial exchange. The precept that the same dollars
should never be taxed to the same taxpayer more than once would be violated.
The court recognized this structural anomaly and adopted an untraditional defi-
nition for the term "cost" in order to maintain the structural integrity of the
Internal Revenue Code. Using the Railway Franchise's fair market value of
$125 as its orginal "cost" basis rather than the $100 value of the Strawberry
Bridge given in exchange for it results in no further gain on the second
transaction.
When property is exchanged for property in a taxable exchange
the taxpayer is taxed on the difference between the adjusted basis of the
property given in exchange and the fair market value of the property
received in the exchange. For purposes of determining gain or loss the
fair market value of the property received is treated as cash and taxed
accordingly. To maintain harmony with the fundamental purpose of
these sections, it is necessary to consider the fair market value of the
property received as the cost basis to the taxpayer. The failure to do so
would result in allowing the taxpayer a stepped-up basis, without paying
a tax therefor, if the fair market value of the property received is less
than the fair market value of the property given, and the taxpayer would
be subject to a double tax if the fair market value of the property re-
ceived is more than the fair market value of the property given. By hold-
ing that the fair market value of the property received in a taxable
exchange is the cost basis, the above discrepancy is avoided and the basis
of the property received will equal the adjusted basis of the property
given plus any gain recognized, or that should have been recognized, or
minus any loss recognized, or that should have been recognized.1 19
That is exactly right. The end result in our hypothetical is that the basis of
the Railway Franchise would be $125 on receipt, which equals the basis of the
Strawberry Bridge ($50) plus the gain that was recognized on the exchange
($75). The taxpayer is right where it should be: It recognized for tax purposes
all the gain it realized on the exchange of the Strawberry Bridge, which included
the excess of the fair market value of the Railway Franchise over the Strawberry
Bridge. Its basis in the Railway Franchise equalled the fair market value of the
franchise itself, which would have been the case if it had simply sold the Straw-
berry Bridge for cash and then purchased the Railway Franchise with after-tax
cash. Any appreciation or depreciation in value from the date of the original
exchange would be realized when the Railway Franchise was itself disposed
of. 120
119. Philadelphia Park, 126 F. Supp. at 188-89 (emphasis added).
120. In the case itself, valuation of the franchise was difficult. Because the parties were unre-
lated and thus were presumed to have bargained at arms' length, the court presumed that the fair
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In short, the term "cost" had to be construed as meaning the fair market
value of property received in a taxable exchange of property, even though the
common understanding of "cost," as well as the regulation interpreting it, would
have looked to the fair market value of what was given up. Otherwise, the un-
derlying structural integrity of the income tax would be undermined because of
the double taxation of the property appreciation to the same taxpayer. Simply
looking up the word "cost" in the dictionary would have led the court to a
wrong result.
Of course, textualists such as Justice Scalia do, in fact, contend that they
consult the overall structure of a statute in interpreting a single word within
it.1 21 However, when words are common ones, such as "cost," instead of un-
common words of art, the temptation is great to use that common dictionary
definition,122 particularly because the textualist will not consult many sources to
market value of the Railway Franchise equalled the fair market value of the Strawberry Bridge,
which was more easily subject to valuation. Id. at 189. The value of the bridge was used only as
evidence, however, regarding the value of the franchise-the real question under the broader theo-
retical inquiry. See id.
121. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 780-81 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Court makes no attempt to establish a textual or structural basis for overriding the plain meaning of
§ 506(d), but rests its decision upon policy intuitions of a legislative character. ... ) (emphasis
added).
122. The most recent-and justifiable, in my opinion--example of that can be found in Com-
missioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993). Soliman was one of the more routine cases, like Burke,
involving policy with a small "p", see infra note 147, not implicating a "structural" issue as that
term is used in this Commentary. At issue in that case was whether an anesthesiologist's home office
constituted his "principal place" of business within the meaning of IR.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A). Id. at
704-05. Soliman spent the majority of his work weeks at the three hospitals where he practiced
anesthesiology, tending to his patients. Id. at 704. He saw no patients in his home. The home office
was used for bookkeeping, professional reading, and like activity, activities concededly essential to
his business. Id. The lower courts concluded that his home office was his "principal place" of
business under all the facts and circumstances and thus allowed deduction of his home office ex-
penses. Id.
In reversing the lower courts, Justice Kennedy, for the majority, wrote:
In interpreting the meaning of the words in a revenue act, we look to the " 'ordinary,
everyday senses' " of the words.... In deciding whether a location is the "principal place
of business," the common sense meaning of "principal" suggests that a comparison of loca-
tions must be undertaken. This view is confirmed by the definition of "principal," which
means "most important, consequential, or influential." Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 1802 (1971).
Id. at 705-06 (citations omitted). Justice Thomas wrote a separate, concurring opinion in which
Justice Scalia joined. Justice Thomas agreed with Justice Kennedy's use of the dictionary definition
of "principal" but disagreed with Justice Kennedy's further assertion that
[i]n determining the proper test for deciding whether a home office is the principal place of
business, we cannot develop an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case.
The inquiry is more subtle, with the ultimate determination of the principal place of busi-
ness being dependent upon the particular facts of each case. There are, however, two pri-
mary considerations in deciding whether a home office is a taxpayer's principal place of
business: the relative importance of the activities performed at each business location and
the time spent at each place.
Id. at 706.
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Justice Thomas wrote:
I certainly agree that the word "principal" connotes "most important," ... but I do not
agree that this definition requires courts in every case to resort to a totality- of-the- circum-
stances analysis when determining whether the taxpayer is entitled to a home office deduc-
tion under § 280A(c)(1)(A). Rather, I think it is logical to assume that the single location
where the taxpayer's business income is generated- i.e., where he provides goods or serv-
ices to clients or customers--will be his principal place of business.
Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
I agree with looking to the dictionary definition here in defining "principal." There is no reason
based on the structural integrity of the Code to interpret "principal place" as "essential place" with-
out comparing the location at issue to other locations. "Principal" does indeed connote a ranking of
places. That is, it is not necessary to give it an unnatural reading in order to avoid frustrating the
larger conceptual structure. Congress sought in enacting I.R.C. § 280A (though such evidence
would be irrelevant to Justice Scalia) to restrict what had been unjustified deductions of home office
expenses under the general business deduction section, I.R.C. § 162, which allows deduction of cur-
rent expenses so long as they meet the much less stringent requirement of being "appropriate and
helpful." See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (interpreting "ordinary and necessary"
requirement of I.R.C. § 162 to mean no more than expense be "appropriate and helpful").
Moreover, there is another bit of "context" that is important here. With depreciation deduc-
tions of real estate under today's lengthened schedules not worth much, the chief benefit for Soliman
under the lower court decisions was that his otherwise nondeductible commuting expenses of travel-
ing from "home" to work were transformed into deductible "business expenses" of traveling from
his "principal place" of business to his secondary places of business. The home office deduction at
issue in Soliman was $1,259. The deduction for his commuting expenses, which the Government
conceded turned on whether he won or lost regarding the location of his "principal place" of busi-
ness, exceeded $3,700. With costs of automobiles increasing dramatically and the recovery period
for cars a short five years under I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(i), the deductibility of Soliman's commuting
expenses would have been the more significant result of a finding in his favor.
When the tax term at issue is not a "common" one that can be looked up in Webster's Diction-
ary but rather a term of art not used in common parlance, Justice Scalia is much more open to
looking beyond the words of a statute. For example, he joined without comment in the unanimous
opinion of Justice Blackmun in the 1991-1992 term in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct.
1039 (1992), which concluded that the term "capital expenditure" includes the legal and investment
banking fees incurred by a target corporation in a friendly takeover. The taxpayer had argued that
the outlay could be currently deducted as a business "expense" under I.R.C. § 162 because only
those outlays creating or improving a separate and distinct asset could constitute nondeductible
"capital expenditures." Id. at 1044. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) disallows deduction for capital expenditures,
defined as "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments
made to increase the value of any property or estate." The regulations give a list of examples, each
of which is connected with property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-I to -2.
In holding that the creation or improvement of a separate and distinct asset is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for an outlay to constitute a nondeductible capital expenditure, Justice
Blackmun returned to first principles, to structural principles. See supra notes 54-56 and accompa-
nying text and infra note 147 (describing structural principles). He returned to the notion underly-
ing the dichotomy between currently deductible "expenses" under I.R.C. § 162 and nondeductible
"capital expenditures." That underlying principle is one of matching, of clearly reflecting income.
In theory, a currently deductible "expense" goes chiefly toward producing this year's earnings and
so should offset this year's earnings by a current deduction in order to reflect income clearly. The
prototypical capital expenditure-the "cost of acquisition .. .of buildings ... and equipment ...
having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year," Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a)-helps pro-
duce income beyond the current year. A current deduction would distort income. The nondeduct-
ibility creates basis, however, which will be deducted over time in the form of depreciation
deductions if the asset has an ascertainable useful life. In that way, the outlay offsets future income
produced in part by that outlay. Thus, the dichotomy between an "expense" and a "capital expendi-
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identify any larger structural concerns. 123 In tax law in particular, that is where
the risk lies. The risk of double taxation in our Philadelphia Park hypothetical
would have been particularly great because the regulation itself adopted the
"common understanding" of the term. The factual context before the court cou-
pled with the court's sensitivity to structural concerns undergirding the income
tax led the court to the right, though nonliteral, interpretation of the term
"cost." Justice Scalia would probably have ruled otherwise.
IV. "COST" AS PURE POLICY CHOICE
Defining the scope of the meaning of the term "cost" in I.R.C. section 1012
is not merely an historical issue. The Bush Administration showed interest over
the summer and fall of 1992 in attempting to impose through executive fiat what
it could not achieve through legislation: a capital-gains tax cut. The method the
Administration proposed for achieving this end was the issuance of a regulation
by the Treasury Department reinterpreting the word "cost" in I.R.C. section
1012 to include adjustments over time to account for inflation. 124
In early August of 1992, Housing Secretary Jack Kemp, along with Sena-
tors Connie Mack of Florida, Trent Lott of Mississippi, Bob Kasten of Wiscon-
sin, and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming, as well as Representatives Vin Weber of
Minnesota and Newt Gingrich of Georgia, sent a memorandum to President
Bush urging him to issue an Executive Order mandating the indexation of basis
to account for inflation.' 25 Increasing the basis of property would, of course,
reduce the amount of income tax paid (or increase the loss) on property when
sold by reducing the amount of taxable gain (or increasing the amount of loss) -
the difference between basis and the sales proceeds. The proposal was actually
much broader than a backdoor capital-gains tax cut of the kind that has been
repeatedly considered and rejected by Congress, most recently and seriously in
1982.126 Because it would apply to all purchased property, including such non-
ture" is really nothing more than a matter of proper timing and better matching of income with the
outlays incurred in producing that income. That concept is not found in any single code section; it is
a structural principle that is the product of the entire scheme of the Code. In INDOPCO, the long-
term benefits accruing to the taxpayer because of the acquisition required capitalization of the acqui-
sition expenses.
123. See, e.g., Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2038 n.2 (1992) (Scalia,
J.) ("The dissent believes petitioner's position on this point to be supported by the history and struc-
ture of the ADA (sources it deems 'more illuminating' than a 'narrow focus' on the ADA's language
...") (emphasis added).
124. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, Does Treasury Have Authority to Index Basis for Infla-
tion?, 55 TAx NOTES 841 (1992) (considering proposal); Geier, supra note 97 (commenting on Pro-
fessor Zelenak's piece).
125. See David Wessel & John Harwood, Conservatives Trying to Force Bush to Back Tax-Cut
Plan at Convention, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 1992, at A12 (reporting on memorandum); A Message for
Houston, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1992, at A14 (reprinting portions of the memorandum, including
the tax provision).




capital assets as inventory, it would be far broader in scope than any prior con-
gressional proposal regarding inflation adjustments.
On August 26, 1992, the National Taxpayers Union Foundation and the
National Chamber Foundation entered the fray by releasing a ninety-page study
concluding that the President, through the Treasury Department, had the au-
thority to require indexation. The authors of that study argued that the Presi-
dent possessed this authority because I.R.C. section 1012 did not specifically
preclude such an interpretation by specifically limiting the determination of cost
to the date of purchase. 127 Under Chevron, the authors continued, the courts
should defer to the new interpretation. 128
On August 31, 1992, Charles J. Cooper, one of the two chief authors of the
study and a former Assistant Attorney General in the Reagan administration,
published an op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal which summarized his argu-
ment. 129 The Journal accompanied the piece with a pungent editorial calling on
President Bush to exercise this new-found power to require inflation adjustments
through his supervisory power over the Treasury Department. 130 The Justice
Department responded with a report concluding that the President had no au-
thority to institute the measure.' 3' That report prompted the President to drop
the idea, 132 even though Mr. Cooper reacted with a second op-ed piece in the
Wall Street Journal decrying the reasoning of the Justice Department.133
Let's assume for a moment that the President did not simply issue an Exec-
utive Order' 34 but rather used his powers of persuasion under Myers v. United
States 135 to cause the Treasury Department to publish a new proposed regula-
tion reinterpreting the word "cost" in I.R.C. section 1012 to include inflation
adjustments. Let's assume that comments were received and considered and the
127. Joanna Richardson, Treasury Empowered to Index Gains Through Regulation, Study
Finds (News), 56 TAX NoTEs 1123 (1992) (describing reports).
128. Id. at 1123-24.
129. Charles J. Cooper, Capital Gains Tax and Presidential Power, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1992,
at A10.
130. An Act of Leadership, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1992, at A10 (editorial).
131. Capital-Gains Indexing Is Dealt Blow by Agency, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1992, at A12.
132. Bush Drops Tax-Cut Proposal, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 4, 1992, at A13.
133. Charles J. Cooper, Capital Gains, as Seen by Congress in 1918, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 1992,
at A16.
134. The executive branch would seem to be on firmer ground if it promulgated a regulation
pursuant to statutory authority rather than relied on the general power to issue Executive Orders. I
want to make the hypothetical as clean as possible so as to get the issue to the courts under Chevron.
135. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Professors Strauss and Sunstein have written:
[T]he authority to make the ultimate decision rests where Congress has placed it-in the
relevant agency. This understanding stems from the notion, set out in Myers v. United
States, that the President has the authority to discharge executive officials, but at least in
some cases, no power to make the ultimate decision (except insofar as the threat of dis-
charge amounts to such power). Under this view, the President's remedy for conduct of
which he disapproves is the politically costly one of removal. Short of that, his authority
... is consultative and supervisory.
Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking,
38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 191 (1986) (footnote omitted).
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regulation issued in final form with reasoned justifications of the sort relied upon
by its proponents. 136 Assume further that a taxpayer with standing could be
found to challenge the validity of the regulation, 137 and the matter came before
Justice Scalia. How might he decide the case? The question's answer is sub-
sumed within the larger issues regarding the proper analytical approach to statu-
tory language and to administrative rule making under Chevron.
A judge who used an originalist approach, ie., one who is not averse to
using legislative history, would have no difficulty in ruling the regulation invalid.
Congress has debated and considered many times whether to index the basis of
assets for inflation-the Senate actually passed a bill to do so in 1982-but has
declined thus far to enact a statute.138 That would be enough for originalist
judges to conclude that the word "cost" was not intended by Congress to in-
clude inflation adjustments.
A judge who took care to protect the current structural integrity of the
Internal Revenue Code should also rule the regulation invalid, even if he or she
would refuse to consider the legislative history of the issue. That is, even if past
legislative decisions to reject basis indexation are ignored as not sufficiently in-
dicative of whether Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue" under the first Chevron step, the word "cost" cannot be viewed in isola-
tion when deciding, under the second Chevron step, whether an interpretation is
"permissible" because "reasonable." 139
"Cost" under I.R.C. section 1012 is not the sole parameter for measuring
property basis. As described below, at least one other basis provision, I.R.C.
section 1014, contains language that cannot be similarly interpreted to include
post-acquisition inflation adjustments. An interpretation of a word in one basis
section that would require inflation adjustments for some property, when legisla-
tive language in at least one other basis section would not allow such an inter-
pretation and such adjustments for precisely the same property, would violate
the structural integrity of the Internal Revenue Code and thus would be an un-
reasonable interpretation.
Let's indulge for a moment the notion that "cost" in I.R.C. section 1012
could be interpreted to include inflation adjustments because, as Mr. Cooper
argued, 14° the statutory words do not limit the determination of "cost" to the
date of purchase. He argued that absent such a statutorily imposed time limita-
tion, the term "cost" might rationally be viewed as the economic investment in
136. See Strauss, supra note 51, at 442 (describing importance of "the behavior of formal justifi-
cation" as opposed to contrary position that "since a statute was imprecise or broadly worded, the
agency may do anything it pleases, or that a court or other outside observer cannot competently tell
whether it is or is not acting within authority").
137. See Zelenak, supra note 124, at 841-42 (noting and discussing the standing problem); TAX
NOTES TODAY, November 16, 1992 (reporting a report issued by Harry G. Gourevitch of Congres-
sional Budget Office that questioned whether member of Congress who voted against statutory in-
dexing provision might have standing to challenge such regulation).
138. See Zelenak, supra note 124, at 843-44.
139. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing Chevron test).
140. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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purchased property, adjusted to account for inflation since purchase.' 4' I.R.C.
section 1014, however, which prescribes the basis of property acquired from a
decedent rather than by purchase, provides that the basis of such property shall
be its "fair market value" and does provide a precise time limitation for the
determination of that value: "at the date of the decedent's death." Unlike I.R.C.
section 1012, I.R.C. section 1014 limits the determination of basis to a single
day. Unlike an unanchored "cost," "fair market value of the property on the
date of the decedent's death" cannot reasonably be interpreted to require infla-
tion adjustments after that date. Furthermore, I.R.C. section 1016, which con-
tains a list of post-acquisition adjustments to basis, contains no language that
would permit post-acquisition inflation adjustments.
Prior congressional proposals to adopt inflation adjustments did not simply
provide for a statutory definition of "cost" under I.R.C. section 1012 that al-
lowed such adjustments for purchased property; they comprehensively took ac-
count of all the various basis rules and whether the asset at issue was a "capital
asset" that should be entitled to inflation adjustments. 42 Moreover, indexing
for inflation must be structurally comprehensive if it is to avoid introducing in-
tolerable distortions far worse than the lack of all inflation adjustments. For
example, debt is not indexed for inflation and could not be as a matter of regula-
tion. The result, of course, is the repayment of debt with deflated dollars in times
of significant inflation. The complexity that would attend indexing debt (ze.,
charging such debtholders with income) to complement the indexed basis of
property is one of the specific reasons why Congress has chosen to reject com-
prehensive indexation. 143  In short, current structural symmetry-between
"purchased" and "inherited" property as well as between property and debt-
would dictate that a regulatory definition of the word "cost" in I.R.C. section
1012 that included inflation adjustments is an unreasonable interpretation. 144
A judge who both ignored legislative history and failed to appreciate the
larger current structure that militates against the reasonableness of an interpre-
tation of "cost" under I.R.C. section 1012 to include inflation adjustments might
nevertheless rule the regulation invalid on a third ground. Because the decision
whether to index property basis for inflation implicates fundamental policy, it is
141. Perhaps we could also argue that a carryover basis, such as one prescribed under I.R.C.
§ 1015 pertaining to gifts, could also be indexed if the transferor's basis was originally determined
under I.R.C. § 1012 because the transferee's basis "is the same as it would be in the hands" of the
transferor. Similarly, perhaps a substitute basis, such as one determined under I.R.C. § 1031(d),
could be indexed if the basis of the exchanged property was originally determined under I.R.C.
§ 1012 because the basis in the property received is the "the same as that of the property
exchanged."
142. See Zelenak, supra note 124, at 843-44 (discussing measures).
143. The indexation of the tax brackets themselves to avoid "bracket creep" is an unrelated
issue: The proposed inflation adjustments to property affect the tax base against which those rates
are applied and thus raise distinct and separate issues.
144. See also Lee A. Sheppard, Some Other Reasons Why Treasury Cannot Index Gains, 56
TAx NOTES 1249 (1992) (News Analysis) (exhaustively critiquing validity of proposed regulation).
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one that should be explicitly made by Congress in express statutory language. 14 5
Whether the "dollars" that are taken into account under the Internal Revenue
Code should be inflation- adjusted dollars is a fundamental political choice, a
policy issue. The issue is not driven by "structural" concerns in the sense in
which the term "structural" is used in this Commentary. 146 That is, interpret-
ing the word "cost" in an uncommon fashion (to include inflation adjustments)
is not necessary to accord with the larger theoretical construct of "income" al-
ready in place 147 under the Internal Revenue Code. The rule that the same
dollars should not be taxed to the same taxpayer more than once (the structural
principle at stake in Philadelphia Park) does not answer the prior policy choice
regarding how those dollars themselves should be measured. The decision
whether to index is pure Policy with a capital "P" under the current Internal
Revenue Code.
So how would Justice Scalia rule? Though his textualist stance combined
with Chevron deference purports to further certainty without litigation, the an-
swer is not entirely clear. But my best educated guess is that he would invalidate
the regulation-the correct result in my opinion-for the same reasons that he
would probably have ruled incorrectly in the Philadelphia Park case. The lan-
guage is sufficiently transitive that there is a good chance that Justice Scalia
would never get to the second Chevron step where deference might be possible.
He would probably define cost in its "ordinary" sense to mean original purchase
price, unadjusted for inflation, under his textualist approach to step one of Chev-
ron. If my hunch is correct, that result further evidences that textualism com-
bined with Chevron will not necessarily lead to expanded executive power. He
would likely have been a thorn in the Bush Administration's side in this case.
145. See supra note 60 and accompanying text and infra note 167 (discussing appropriateness
of textualism in this context).
This approach to fundamental policy choices implies that Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983), see infra notes 150-61 and accompanying text, should in fact have used textualism
and ruled in favor of Bob Jones University because the policy decision was a fundamental one that
should have been made by Congress. A different sort of pragmatism, however, entered into that case
that would not enter into most statutory interpretation cases. With the exception of Justice Rehn-
quist, the Justices obviously did not want to be viewed by the general public as blessing racial dis-
crimination in education. The Court knew that a decision based on statutory interpretation
principles-principles that recognize the institutional competence of Congress to make the sort of
fundamental policy decision that is inherent in deciding whether to allow tax exemption to educa-
tional institutions that discriminated on the basis of race-would be misunderstood by the public.
Most would appreciate only the end result: that the Supreme Court (not Congress) allowed a school
that discriminated on the basis of race to maintain its tax exemption. In that sense, Bob Jones
University is a unique case, a case that, because of its subject matter, is not helpful in making genera-
lized statements about statutory interpretation.
146. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (describing structural concerns in tax).
147. "Structural" arguments, as used here, perhaps might be best understood as representing
"Policy" with a capital "P" instead of a small "p," policy in the sense of the prior decisions regard-
ing the overall structure of the income tax and embedded in the Internal Revenue Code as a whole.
That is, if Congress should adopt indexing, the resulting "structure" of the Internal Revenue Code
would be fundamentally altered. An issue could arise under that new structure that could then




My guess that he would invalidate the regulation seems to be contrary to
the following statement written by Justice Scalia:
[T]he capacity of the Chevron approach to accept changes in agency
interpretation ungrudgingly seems to me one of the strongest indica-
tions that the Chevron approach is correct. It has always seemed to me
utterly unrealistic to believe that when an agency revises one of its
interpretative regulations . . . the agency was admitting that it had
"got the law wrong." And it has thus seemed to me inappropriate to
look askance at such changes, as though we were dealing with a judge
who cannot make up his mind whether the rule in Shelley's Case ap-
plies or not. Rather, the agency was simply "changing the law," in
light of new information or even new social attitudes impressed upon it
through the political process-all within the limited range of discre-
tion to "change the law" conferred by the governing statute. Chevron,
as I say, permits recognition of this reality.' 48
Yet, I believe that expansive position pertains only to those cases in which the
language before the court is sufficiently intransitive to allow Justice Scalia to get
beyond Chevron's first step.
His reference to changes in social attitudes as a legitimate justification for a
changed interpretation evokes the tax case most often cited in the literature 4 9 as
demonstrating dynamic statutory interpretation, Bob Jones University v. United
States. 150 The Supreme Court there affirmed the validity of an interpretation of
I.R.C. section 501(c)(3), issued in a Revenue Ruling, 15 1 that revoked the tax-
exempt status of educational institutions that discriminated on the basis of
race.' 5 2 An originalist interpretation would have resulted in ruling the new in-
terpretation invalid; the Code section was adopted at a time when Plessy v. Fer-
guson 153 was the law of the land. Disdaining originalism, however, the majority
agreed with the Internal Revenue Service that such organizations are not "chari-
table," and thus the ruling's interpretation that such entities are not entitled to
148. Scalia, supra note 32, at 518-19.
149. See, e.g., Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1546-49; Eskridge
& Frickey, supra note 3, at 343-44; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits ofAggressive Judicial
Review of Agency Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522, 534.
150. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). A more recent and just-as-dramatic change in agency policy upheld
under Chevron is found in Rust v. Sullivan, Il1 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The regulations upheld in that
case prohibited doctors at federally funded clinics to discuss with clinic patients the option of abor-
tion. Id. at 1765. These regulations took an about face from earlier regulations that permitted
doctors to discuss abortion, though abortions could not be performed at the clinics. Id. at 1768-69.
There was no change in the statutory law underlying the regulations.
151. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. The Court did not focus upon the status of the au-
thority as a revenue ruling, which is issued by the Internal Revenue Service without notice or com-
ment and which has been interpreted in other cases as amounting to no better authority than the
Service's litigating position. See, e.g., Armco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 865, 868 (1986) (refer-
ring to authority at issue as no better authority than revenue ruling, which only states "the institu-
tional litigating position of the Internal Revenue Service"). See generally Linda Galler, Emerging
Standards for Judicial Review of Revenue Rulings, 72 B.U. L. REV. 841 (1992) (analyzing appropri-
ate status of revenue rulings).
152. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
153. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (affirming separate-but-equal doctrine).
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tax exemption under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) was reasonable. 154 The Court also
relied heavily upon the fact that during the twelve-year interim between the issu-
ance of the controversial ruling and the Bob Jones decision, thirteen bills were
introduced to overturn the executive interpretation of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3),
but none emerged from committee. 155 The majority thus concluded that Con-
gress's inaction should be construed as an endorsement of the radical departure
from the prior interpretation of the unamended words of the statute.
156
Notwithstanding the apparent congruence between Justice Scalia's quoted lan-
guage regarding changed social attitudes and the majority's result in Bob Jones,
I think Justice Scalia, had he been on the Court at the time, would have joined
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case. In the first place, he would have, unlike
the majority, ignored as irrelevant the legislative history concerning the failed
bills to overturn the new interpretation. More importantly, the specificity of the
language would not have allowed him to defer. Just as in Burke 157 and in our
hypothetical "cost" case, Justice Scalia would likely have never gotten to the
second Chevron step in Bob Jones, where deference to a changed agency inter-
pretation because of changed circumstances is possible, because he would have
found no ambiguity in the first place under the first Chevron step using his textu-
alist approach.
A strict textualist approach is precisely what Bob Jones University argued
in the case itself.158 The language in I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) provides for tax
exemption for all entities "operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . .. or
educational purposes . . . ."159 Bob Jones University argued that the Internal
Revenue Service could not replace the disjunctive word "or" with the conjunc-
tive word "and," thereby requiring institutions to operate with both charitable
and educational purposes in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. Only
Congress could do that. "Educational" and "religious" organizations need not,
154. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 596-99.
I disagree with Professor Sunstein's characterization of the case. He states that
the Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service could not grant tax deductions
to private schools that discriminate on the basis of race.... The Bob Jones decision is best
understood as an effort to ensure that the IRS takes account of the widespread social antag-
onism toward racial discrimination, since that antagonism now forms a part of the general
thrust of contemporary "public policy."
Sunstein, supra note 149, at 534 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). The Internal Revenue Service
is the entity that promulgated the Revenue Ruling at issue in the case that newly interpreted I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) to prohibit tax exemption (not "deductions") for educational institutions that discrimi-
nated on the basis of race. It was Bob Jones University that challenged the lawfulness of that new
Internal Revenue Service interpretation. The Court was not confronted with a case in which the
Service argued that it could interpret the words to allow tax exemption for schools that discriminate,
resulting in a decision by the Court that "it could not," in the words of Professor Sunstein. The
Court held only that the Service's interpretation was reasonable because "the responsibility for con-
struing the Code falls to the IRS." Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 597.
155. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 600-01.
156. See id. at 601.
157. See supra notes 76-105 and accompanying text (discussing Burke).




the plaintiff argued, also be "charitable" under the statute as written, as each is a
separate and independent ground establishing tax-exempt status. The statute
did not by its terms vest authority in the Service to decide whether certain enti-
ties literally falling within the language of I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) should never-
theless be denied tax-exempt status. 16° Moreover, the longstanding history of
the prior interpretation, which allowed racial discrimination by tax-exempt edu-
cational institutions, would have been important to Justice Scalia under the first
Chevron step. He has stated:
I should also add that the existence of a "long-standing, consistent
agency interpretation" that dates to the original enactment of the stat-
ute may be relevant to the first step of Chevron-that is, it may be part
of the evidence showing that the statute is in fact not ambiguous but
has a clearly defined meaning. 161
The longstanding interpretation of "cost" in I.R.C. section 1012 as original
purchase price without adjustment for inflation would, I believe, have buttressed
Justice Scalia's conclusion that the hypothetical case should be resolved under
Chevron step one against the validity of the regulation. Thus, in our hypotheti-
cal case, Justice Scalia would have ruled correctly, I believe, though many might
disagree with the textual road he would likely have taken to get there. Might
not the better approach be to consider the pragmatic mix of the language itself,
the current structure of the Internal Revenue Code militating against the reason-
ableness of the interpretation, the prior legislative history indicating that such an
interpretation is not tenable, as well as the fact that such fundamental policy
ought to be made by Congress?
V. EPILOGUE
In his lay primer on deconstruction, David Lehman describes the difference
between what others have termed "hard-core" and "soft-core" deconstruc-
tion, 162 finding the former leading to the apocalyptic abyss while finding the
latter a helpful tool among many in literary studies. 163
[Hard-core deconstruction] is "hard" in the sense of being putatively
rigorous (or rigid, depending on your viewpoint) and defiantly difficult
to follow. It is programmatic. It asks to be taken as something more
than a critical method-something like an antitheological theology.
160. See 461 U.S. at 585-86.
161. Scalia, supra note 32, at 518.
162. LEHMAN, supra note 3, at 117-31.
163. Lehman writes:
The word [soft-core deconstruction] is a handy one to have, and the tactics that go with
it-the tendency, for example, to focus one's attention not on the center but on the margins
of a text or an event-can be fruitfully used. Hard-core deconstruction is something else
again. It proceeds not from the love of literature but from the tacit assumption that litera-
ture exists primarily to illustrate the laws of a critical doctrine. Worse, it asks to be ac-
cepted in toto, not adapted into a critical instrument to be used in discretion. The
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By contrast, soft-core deconstruction is an elastic critical concept and
is meant to be used with a lighter touch; a synonym might be "practi-
cal" or "applied" deconstruction. It differs from hard-core decon-
struction in having a strictly provisional value and an utterly
pragmatic function; its use does not imply the critic's subscription to
deconstructive doctrine in any larger sense. Soft-core deconstruction
may serve to describe virtually any form of critical interpretation that
is concerned with the tricky relations between language and meaning,
between what is said and what is hidden, in a text. It refuses the
mandatory trip to the linguistic abyss but retains the sense of decon-
struction as a devastating critique, an expose, an unmasking .... 164
Soft-core deconstruction is no more than one tool among many, a means to
an end in the larger endeavor of exploring those texts that lend themselves par-
ticularly well to its technique.1 6 5 Hard-core deconstruction is pure theory, an
end in itself, independent of the text. For the hard-core deconstructionist, the
deconstructed text is secondary to the theory itself; the text itself becomes the
tool that is used to exemplify the ends of the theory. Hard-core deconstruction
"displays the critic's monumental conceit; it depicts [the author of the decon-
structed text] as no more than an unwitting mouthpiece for the theories of [the
deconstructionist]. That is what opponents of deconstruction have in mind
when they castigate it for parading the critic's superiority over the text."' 16 6 A
164. Id. at 118-19.
165. One example of soft-core deconstruction is recounted by Lehman as follows:
Deconstruction's methods and concepts, used selectively and without doctrinal fervor,
can sometimes bring us closer to the frequently enigmatic workings of some of our favorite
books or films. The poet and critic John Hollander, a masterly teacher, demonstrates the
pedagogical virtues of soft-core deconstruction when he observes that "Charlie Chaplin
deconstructs public statuary in the opening frames of City Lights." No other word will
work so well to describe the effect of the brilliant sequence in which the tramp, played by
Chaplin, sabotages the ceremonial unveiling of a new civic monument. The scene opens in
a modem metropolis, downtown. In the background is the monument-a group of three
statues-draped in sheets. At the podium, speeches are delivered by pompous bigwigs.
There is a fanfare of trumpets. Then the wraps come off, and there, to everyone's surprise,
is the tramp, asleep in the lap of the central statue. He wakes up, tries to escape-and his
trousers are impaled by the sword of the adjacent statue. A policeman in the crowd is
outraged by these antics but, luckily for the tramp, the Star Spangled Banner is played at
just this moment, and everyone, including the policeman, must stand at attention. What
Chaplin has done in this sequence is to unveil an unveiling. By showing us the tramp
comfortably sleeping in the statue's lap, Chaplin deconstructs the monument by turning it
into its opposite. He makes us see the monument for what it is--cold and forbidding-by
depicting it, for the moment, as welcoming and homey. The incongruity of the tramp's
presence drives home the point. The monument is seen for what it really is when the
tramp's trousers are impaled by the bronze sword. For now we recall that the statue is a
monument to "Peace and Prosperity"- claims that are belied by the tramp's very existence
and this depression year 1931. Humanized by the tramp, the statue signifies not "Peace
and Prosperity" but the reality that it was meant to exclude-poverty and the threat of
violence. Minus the tramp, it is merely a monument to human vanity and wishful
thinking.
Id. at 120-21.
166. Id. at 131. See id. at 125-31 (providing two examples of hard-core deconstruction too
lengthy to be reprinted here).
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greater understanding of the text itself, the goal of literary studies, is lost in
hard-core deconstruction.
The theology of hard-core textualism of the sort championed by its doyen,
Justice Scalia, suffers from the same criticisms as its virtual antithesis, the theol-
ogy of hard-core deconstruction. Hard-core deconstruction insists upon a cha-
otic lack of definitive meaning, often in spite of the text. Hard-core textualism
insists upon the single meaning arrived at by a sterile parsing of the statutory
words, often in spite of the factual and statutory context. Both ignore the
greater ends for which the technique is ostensibly employed. The ultimate goal
in statutory cases-to apply the statute in question so as to realize rather than
undermine its reason for being at that point in time in that particular case-can
be sacrificed to the theory of hard-core textualism. The means obstinately be-
come the ends; theory, hardened into dogma, subsumes purpose; the jurist is not
really a contemplative "judge" but rather is an unthinking automaton with a
dictionary.
What pragmatic legal theorists might call soft-core textualism is, like soft-
core deconstruction, a practical and pragmatic tool, one which can be judi-
ciously used as the means to arrive at the greater ends. Though hard-core textu-
alists are suspicious of the perceived elasticity of soft-core textualism, soft-core
textualism is itself constrained by the text. The point of disagreement between
the two camps is simply the scope of the constraining "text." The "text" to the
hard-core textualist is the "pure" text of the statute, definite and static, in large
part divorced from context. The "text" constraining the decision of the soft-
core textualist is not so constipated. That is, soft-core textualism is constrained
by-but does allow consideration of-external context.
Perhaps that external context might demonstrate that a nonliteral interpre-
tation is necessary in order to implement the implicit structural framework of
the current statute, as pondered here under the Internal Revenue Code and as
exemplified by Philadelphia Park. Perhaps that external context might demon-
strate that a hard-core textualist approach is warranted because the ambiguity
involves a significant, fundamental policy choice that should explicitly be made
by Congress, such as whether to index the basis of certain property for infla-
tion.' 67 Perhaps that external context might demonstrate that a dynamic statu-
167. Wilkinson and Volkmann, writing in 1975, provided another example from the field of
Indian Law. They argued that courts should adopt a hard-core textualist approach to statutory
language when trying to decide whether Congress intended to abrogate prior Indian treaties which
were inconsistent with later statutory enactments. See Wilkinson & Volkmann, supra note 60. Only
Congress has the authority to abrogate a treaty, and courts ought to insist upon statutory language
evidencing that intent rather than infer from snippets of legislative history that this very significant
policy choice with a capital I"', see supra note 147, was in fact made, even though such a hard-core
textualist approach is not appropriate in all contexts.
In deciding whether to apply the rule of express legislative action [what we could here
call "textualism"], courts have based their determinations, either explicitly or implicitly,
upon the importance of the subject matter at issue. The Supreme Court has stated that the
rule is appropriate in "traditionally sensitive areas," and a lower court has noted that the
Supreme Court has applied the rule in cases "limiting the free exercise of important
rights." Scholars have found the rule applicable to "large decisions of policy" and "funda-
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tory interpretation is warranted because either a strict textualist or originalist
interpretation would frustrate a dramatic swing in policy since enactment of the
statute at issue. 168 Finally, perhaps that external context might demonstrate
that the judicious use of originalism, with its look to legislative history, actually
helps put the picture in focus for the judge who has the hard task of deciding the
remaining cases.
In most instances, an explicit choice among these approaches is not neces-
sary, for they all converge toward a single result, as I believe they would have in
our hypothetical case involving the indexation of basis under a regulatory defini-
tion of the word "cost" in I.R.C. section 1012. Litigation may result both be-
cause the approaches do not converge and because there are such strongly held
views on both sides regarding the proper approach to the language at issue that
both sides are willing to commit significant economic resources to pursue their
respective perspectives. Under those circumstances, perhaps the wise and prag-
matic judge realizes that the job he or she must perform should not ignore the
context that caused such strongly held views. The "proper" approach to the
language at issue in that case may in fact be a hard-core textualist one in the
sense that Justice Scalia uses it. Then again, it may not be. And perhaps that
may not be indefensible.
mental problems." The rule of express legislative action should not be over-extended, since
a wholesale application of the rule could effectively hamstring legislatures. Legislatures
must necessarily deal in generalities in this complex society, delegating many decisions to
administrative agencies. Nevertheless, courts are becoming much more chary of the unfet-
tered exercise of power by administrators, especially when they are making major policy
decisions not clearly delegated by the legislature. Courts have thus balanced the interests
involved, applying the rule of express legislative action in certain areas of major impor-
tance. Implicit in this process is the recognition that certain questions are best answered by
legislators rather than courts or administrators.
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 60, at 654-55 (footnotes omitted). Wise words.
168. Again we can look to the field of Indian Law here as an example. It is a particularly rich
field for use of this method because many statutes were enacted in eras in which termination of tribal
life coupled with assimilation into the dominant political, legal, and social culture animated federal
Indian policy. Using dynamic statutory interpretation, courts resolving interpretive disputes under
these statutes can discount the legislative history of the enacting Congress and, if the language per-
mits, interpret the language at issue in light of the current federal Indian policy of self-determina-
tion, which lies on the opposite end of the spectrum from assimilation. See supra note 32 (describing
the Yakima Tribe tax case).
19931

